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The proliferation of wireless computer equipment and Local Area Networks 
(LANs) create an increasingly common and growing threat to Marine Corps Network 
infrastructure and communication security (COMSEC).  This threat requires a capable 
deterrent in order to mitigate risks associated with both official and un-official wireless 
LANs.  The potential efficiencies gained by employing wireless technology within the 
Marine Corps and DoD is quite significant.  The Marine Corps must leverage this 
relatively inexpensive technology to conduct operations cheaper, faster and more 
effectively.  However, these same wireless LAN capabilities have introduced new ways 
in which critical information infrastructure can be viewed, altered or even denied.  Our 
thesis proposes the assessment of multiple installations within DoD in order to identify 
vulnerabilities and ensure secure employment of wireless technologies.   These 
assessments will enable the development of adequate measures to secure existing 
wireless transmissions and protect future transmissions from observation, modification or 
denial of service. 
This thesis will assess threats posed to network infrastructure by wireless 
networks and evaluate WLANs that exist within the DoD to determine adequate measures 
to secure transmissions made by those networks.  Vulnerability assessments of multiple 
services at different DoD installations will be conducted in order to gather a wide range 
of input.  The assessments will provide an indication of how DoD installations are 
leveraging wireless capabilities to improve support to the operating forces.  These 
vulnerability assessments will also provide insight into the current security posture within 
the DoD with regard to wireless communications.  The practices employed by these 
services will be evaluated to determine the best means of standardizing wireless security 
procedures within the Marine Corps.   In addition, a diverse assortment of wireless 
software and hardware tools will be tested in order to ascertain the best methods for 
monitoring and securing wireless networks within DoD.  The evaluation of these 
software and hardware tools will facilitate the creation of inexpensive and easily 
distributed WLAN tool kits which can be employed at installations across DoD.  Finally 
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this thesis will make recommendations on how to improve the WLAN vulnerability 
assessment capability within the Marine Corps.   
Specifically, this research will start with the identification of current wireless 
network requirements and known vulnerabilities as well as threats and attacks posed to 
wireless networks within DoD.  Current solutions available for securing wireless 
networks will be identified as an attempt to bridge the gap between what is currently 
available and what is required to ensure wireless network security.  Data will be collected 
and analyzed from wireless vulnerability assessments throughout the DoD which will 
provide a statistically diverse framework to conduct the research.  Selected wireless 
vulnerability assessments will be completed working in conjunction with the National 
Security Agency (NSA), Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC), Marine Corps 
Network Operations Security Command (MCNOSC) and Headquarters Marine Corps 
(HQMC) C4.  This analysis will provide insight into assessing and securing wireless 
networks in garrison environments and provide answers to our research questions.  
Current wireless tools will be evaluated  in order to provide an assessment of their 
usefulness and relevance within DoD. In addition, a standard set of software and 
hardware tools will be identified which can be purchased locally by installation level 
network administrator or deployed centrally from HQMC.  The goal of this toolkit would 
be to provide the network administrators with a powerful but relatively inexpensive 
arsenal for detecting, assessing and securing wireless networks within their organizations.  
Once relevant software and hardware tools are identified, standard procedures will be 
created for detecting, assessing and securing wireless networks on Marine Corps 
installations or within Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs).  The goal of the 
procedures will be to provide network administrators with specific instructions for 
successfully managing wireless networks within his or her area of responsibility.  The 
final step of this research will be to determine recommendations to Marine Corps 
Network Operations Security Command (MCNOSC) and HQMC C4 regarding 
improving the WLAN vulnerability assessment capability within the Marine Corps.  
Ultimately, the research will result in a proposed solution which presents the appropriate 
response to mitigate the risks associated with WLAN technology.   
 vii
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The convenience created by wireless devices coupled with their relatively low 
cost was largely responsible for the exponential growth of WLANs over the past decade.  
However, the conveniences of wireless technology came at a significant cost.  WLANs 
have introduced vulnerabilities which must be countered in order to continue to reap the 
fruits of wireless labor.  Policy designers realized the shortfalls inherent in the 802.11 
standard and have subsequently released more security conscious standards.  In addition, 
DoD has established guidance which levies even more stringent requirements upon 
wireless network implementations within DoD. Despite the presence of rigorous 
standards, which must be met in order to implement wireless networks, WLANs can be 
found on installations across the Marine Corps.  The small strides made by additional 
security conscious standards and more stringent DoD and Marine Corps wireless policies 
have not slowed the growth of WLANs or eliminated the threats introduced by wireless 
technologies to Marine Corps information infrastructure. 
This thesis will assess threats posed to network infrastructure by wireless 
networks and evaluate WLANs that exist within the DoD to determine adequate measures 
to monitor transmissions made by those networks.  Vulnerability assessments will be 
conducted of multiple services at different DoD installations to provide a relevant sample 
for the study. The assessments will provide an indication of how DoD installations are 
leveraging wireless capabilities to improve support to the operating forces.  These 
vulnerability assessments will also provide insight into the current security posture within 
the DoD with regard to wireless communications.  The practices employed by these 
services will be evaluated to determine the best means of standardizing wireless 
vulnerability procedures within the Marine Corps.   In addition, a diverse assortment of 
wireless software and hardware tools will be tested in order to ascertain the best methods 
for conducting vulnerability assessments within DoD.  The evaluation of these software 
and hardware tools will facilitate the creation of a WLAN vulnerability assessment tool 
kits which can be employed at installations across DoD.  Finally, this thesis will make 
 xxiv
recommendations as to the best ways to improve the WLAN vulnerability assessment 
capability within the Marine Corps.   
The plethora of WLANs in existence today was confirmed during the conduct of 
numerous WLAN vulnerability assessments aboard DoD and Marine Corps installations 
during the past year.  A critical investment of personnel and resources is required to 
create such a capability.  Leaders, by and large, are not aware of the presence of WLANs 
or the threats introduced by them. In addition, personnel responsible for managing 
installation network resources are aware of wireless technology, but do not have the 
specific training or tools required to assess WLANs within their organizations.  The 
widespread presence of WLANs aboard DoD installations requires the development of a 
mature WLAN vulnerability assessment capability within the Marine Corps.   
The combination of each of these factors creates substantial risks to information 
infrastructure aboard Marine Corps installations.  The lack of awareness and training 
requires a dynamic and proactive training plan which leverages the WLAN expertise of 
external agencies. In addition, specific WLAN tools are needed to properly outfit 
organization IA personnel with the requisite tools to locate and assess WLANs.  
However, the most effective method to mitigate the risks associated with cheap, plentiful, 
unsecured wireless devices is to conduct WLAN vulnerability assessments.  Effective 
training programs and capable tools combined with a proficient WLAN vulnerability 
assessment team will serve as an invaluable resource in mitigating the risks associated 














    I. INTRODUCTION   
A. BACKGROUND 
The proliferation of wireless computer equipment and Local Area Networks 
(LANs) create an increasingly common and growing threat to Marine Corps Network 
infrastructure and communication security (COMSEC).  This threat requires a capable 
deterrent in order to mitigate risks associated with both official and un-official wireless 
LANs.  The potential efficiencies gained by employing wireless technology within the 
Marine Corps and DoD is quite significant.  The Marine Corps must leverage this  
relatively inexpensive technology to conduct operations cheaper, faster and more 
effectively.  However, these same wireless LAN capabilities have introduced new ways 
in which critical information infrastructure can be viewed, altered or even denied.  Our 
thesis proposes the assessment of multiple installations within DoD in order to identify 
vulnerabilities and ensure secure employment of wireless technologies.   These 
assessments will enable the development of adequate measures to secure existing 
wireless transmissions and protect future transmissions from observation, modification or 
denial of service.  
 
B. PURPOSE  
The primary goal of our research was to enhance or develop the WLAN 
vulnerability assessment capability within the Marine Corps.  There are obviously many 
ways in which one can attempt to approach this broad topic.  Many students have labored 
in the complex arena of wireless security in the past.  We have seen a great deal of 
valuable and insightful research completed in various aspects of wireless security.  In 
preparation for our thesis, we studied a great deal of this research and came to the 
conclusion that the majority of existing work provided technical data on advanced 
wireless subjects and policies.  Consequently, we wanted our research to provide a 
practical, hands-on approach to the subject.   Our research will provide individuals tasked 
with managing wireless networks with background, context and fundamental principles 
of wireless security.  This vital information will lay the foundation for the practical 
application of procedures, software and hardware tools and lessons learned from other 
2 
wireless network implementations.  The final result desired is that individuals tasked with 
wireless network security are equipped with the often over-looked fundamental 
principles, real world applications, and the requisite software and hardware tools to 
accomplish the task. 
 
C. TARGET AUDIENCE 
Our target audience would range from installation G-6’s to unit level network 
administrators.  Our research seeks to expose this audience to the relatively new and 
challenging arena of wireless network security.  While many of these individuals are 
familiar with network security as it pertains to wired infrastructure, we learned that the 
vast majority were unfamiliar with our proposed subject matter. 
 
D. DOD GUIDANCE 
Although the purpose of our thesis research was not intended to present the details 
of DoD wireless policy, it is obviously germane to any discussion of wireless assessment 
and security.  We have chosen to weave the principles of these policies into our 
discussion throughout various chapters without delving into the minute details of specific 
protocols or standards.  We have purposely avoided an extensive discussion of specific 
policies for several reasons.  First, policies evolve over time and our desire was to speak 
to overarching principles which govern wireless assessment and security vice describing 
particular policies, protocols and standards which are more subject to change over time.  
Second, as previously alluded to, we came to the determination that there was an 
abundance of technical discussion regarding the definition and application of specific 
protocols and policies already in existence. Finally, our desired target audience was 
network administrators and higher level leaders who are fairly new to the arena of 
wireless security.  We believe that these individuals require a more practical approach 
and exposure to wireless security and assessment, which is not overwhelmed by technical 
verbiage.   While the evaluation of the specific characteristics of DoD policy is outside 
the scope of our thesis, the policies shown in Figure 1 guided our discussion throughout 
our research.   In addition to the references listed in Figure 1, we used the following Navy 
and Marine Corps specific guidance: Marine Corps Information Assurance Operational 
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Standard USMC IA OPSTD 014 Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) and Technical 




Figure 1.   Wireless Directives (From Ref. 1) 
 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following questions serve as the impetus for our research and will be 
answered throughout the course of our thesis: 
1.) What threats and vulnerabilities are introduced to the Marine Corps 
critical information infrastructure by emerging wireless technologies? 
2.)  What fundamental network security principles should be applied to safeguard 
wireless communications? 
3.)   How is the Marine Corps currently leveraging wireless technologies to 
support operating forces and supporting establishments? 
                                                 
1Department of Defense, Defense Information Systems Agency, (2004), Wireless Security Support 
Program, Wireless LAN Security Framework, (sec. 3, p. 1). 
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4.)   How are DoD and Marine Corps activities performing with regard to secure 
wireless implementations and assessment capabilities? 
5.)  What economical software and hardware solutions are available to assess and 
secure WLANs? 
6.)   What standards or procedures must be enacted in order to ensure Marine 
Corps wireless networks adhere to Department of Defense and Department of the Navy 
Wireless Policies? 
7.)  What recommended changes or additions to existing wireless policy will 
improve the current security posture within the Marine Corps? 
8.)  What type of implementation and use of encryption would ensure the 
necessary protection of wireless networks and are there any DoD approved and secure 
networks to model after? 
 
F. THE ROAD AHEAD 
Our thesis will seek to introduce individuals to wireless security by progressively 
exposing the need for security through the identification of real world threats and 
vulnerabilities posed to wireless networks.  Once the threats and vulnerabilities to 
wireless infrastructure are discussed, we will review network security fundamentals and 
wireless security principles which will help mitigate those threats.  Our thesis will then 
look at 802.11 initiatives and implementations within the Marine Corps in order to 
expose individuals to the Marine Corps wireless “state of affairs.  Once we review 
examples of wireless implementations within the Marine Corps, we will discuss the 
results of actual wireless network vulnerability assessments that we conducted.  These 
assessments will show the need for standard procedures for assessing and securing 
wireless networks.  Given standard procedures, we will discuss potential software and 
hardware solutions that are available to wireless network administrators.  Our thesis will 
also provide recommended software and hardware solutions based on our evaluation 
during the course of our research.  We will then discuss a model or exemplar wireless 
network implementation within the Department of Defense, which will show current 
technology adapted to DoD regulations and policies.  Our research will conclude by 
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II. WIRELESS LOCAL AREA NETWORK (WLAN) THREATS 
AND VULNERABILITIES  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The best way to begin securing a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) is 
learning who and what your potential threats are as well as your operating vulnerabilities.  
Also, you must know what the value of the data is that you want to protect.  You must 
decide if high value data can be protected on a wireless network.  Threats range from 
people, support infrastructure, to natural disasters.  The vulnerabilities that exist within 
WLANs arise from many sources but the 802.11 protocol itself has serious weaknesses 
that have been partially addressed in recent iterations of the 802.11 protocol such as 
802.11i.  Another example of a vulnerability comes from the technical misconfiguration 
of devices on the network.  These threats and vulnerabilities will be discussed and 
analyzed further in the following sections. 
 
B. THREATS 
It is just as important to know what kind of individuals or groups would be 
interested in attacking your network as it is being aware of their motivations.  For 
example, a government WLAN may be threatened by activists from interest groups, other 
countries’ intelligence and surveillance community or terrorists.  In this instance, the 
government would need high-level security because of the greater skill level achieved by 
other countries and the obvious sensitive information that they would be after.  In 
contrast, a corporate WLAN may be threatened by disgruntled former employees or 
competitors.  These employees could pose a minimal threat depending on what kind of 
access they were given and how quickly it was taken away.  On the other hand, 
competitors could hire extremely skilled IT professionals to carry out attacks on a WLAN 
in order to obtain proprietary information or to gain a competitive edge. 
 
1. Insider Threats 
 Insider threats comprise the single largest threat to any organization.  In a WLAN 
with lower level security procedures this threat could initiate itself by providing 
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unauthorized users with the Service Set Identification (SSID) which would be needed to 
access the network.  For a more secure WLAN, the insider threat proliferates by opening 
up opportunities for theft of laptops that leave the building.  In many cases the insider 
threat comes from accidentally or maliciously deleting files where most security 
mechanisms cannot prevent these types of problems.  Another common act that is 
represented by the insider threat comes from the abuse of authority.  Accessing network 
shares that an employee does not have rights to or reading other employees emails are 
both serious insider threats that are very difficult to prevent.  Simpler insider threats 
include the use of unauthorized software, using company resources for illegal acts or 
personal profit, theft or destruction of computer equipment, unauthorized hardware or 
peripherals, and disclosure of sensitive data.  A good example of an insider threat is an 
authorized user that installs unauthorized software such as GoToMyPC which is software 
that is designed to bypasses organization’s firewalls and gives remote users, backdoor 
access to the network. 
 
2. Outsider Threats 
 As mentioned previously, outsider threats come from various sources that range 
from serious to very minimal security risks.  Outsider threats can include amateur or 
professional hackers, terrorists, competitors, activists, former employees, contractors, 
unsponsored or organized criminals, and media representatives.   
 At least seven foreign countries are training their intelligence officers in how to 
hack into U.S. computers2.  Government networks, proprietary commercial information, 
and scientific research are all vulnerable. 
 
C. VULNERABILITIES 
While a Threat is commonly understood to be anything that is a source of danger, 
an identified vulnerability is something that may expose your network to the identified 
threats.  Vulnerabilities are regularly discovered and announced by vendors and authors 
of affected devices, software, or protocols.  There are also multiple agencies that are 
                                                 
2Dennis Hughes, (1997, February 3), Outsider Threats, Fortune, p.27. 
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devoted to discovering vulnerabilities and disseminating information about them.  One 
such organization is dedicated to government cyber security called The United States 
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) which is a partnership between the 
Department of Homeland Security and the public and private sectors.  Established in 
2003 to protect the nation's Internet infrastructure, US-CERT coordinates defense against 
and responses to cyber attacks across the nation.  The following excerpt from the US-
CERT is an example of a known vulnerability and is very difficult to defend against. 
IEEE 802.11 wireless network protocols use a Clear Channel Assessment 
(CCA) algorithm to determine whether or not the radio frequency (RF) 
channel is clear so that a device on the network can transmit data. The 
CCA algorithm used in conjunction with Direct Sequence Spread 
Spectrum (DSSS) transmission is vulnerable to an attack in which a 
specially crafted RF signal will cause the algorithm to conclude that the 
channel is busy, so that no device in range of the signal will transmit data. 
This type of signal is sometimes called "jabber." The attacker must be 
actively transmitting a signal and within range to affect wireless devices3. 
 
D. ATTACKS 
There are many, very well documented attacks on WLANs which can circumvent 
established security procedures with relative ease.  Defense Information Systems Agency 
defines a high level view of common attacks on wireless networks in the following 
categories: Traffic Analysis, Passive Eavesdropping, Plaintext attack, Unauthorized 
Access, Man in the Middle, ARP attacks, Replay attacks, Session Hijacking, Redirection, 
and Denial of Service4.  Many of the most devastating attacks are hard to accomplish 
without extensive knowledge in both network and host penetration techniques as well as 
radio frequency theory and application.  The following section represents an assessment 




                                                 
3The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), Vulnerability Note 
VU#106678, http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/106678, August 8, 2005. 
4Department of Defense, Defense Information Systems Agency, (2004), Wireless Security Support 
Program, Wireless LAN Security Framework, (sec. 2, p. 1). 
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1. War Driving 
War driving is the simplest and most frequently used attack on WLANs because 
of the simplicity and the small amount of knowledge needed.  In order to perform this 
attack, you would need a laptop or PDA and a wireless network card or to increase your 
range you could attach an antenna.  There are open source software tools as well that will 
display the SSID, signal strength, channel, and whether or not Wired Equivalent Privacy 
(WEP) is being used of any 802.11 WLAN.  The major risk involved with this attack is 
the fact that any novice user could accomplish it without prior training of any kind.  This 
becomes such a large risk because the impact ranges from simple information leakage or 
bandwidth reduction to completely compromising an entire network. 
 
a. Countermeasures to War Driving 
The quickest and easiest solution to combat war driving is to turn off the 
broadcast SSID to prevent novice hackers from seeing what SSID is being used.  The 
next step would be to set up an Access Control List (ACL) with only authorized Media 
Access Control (MAC) addresses allowed to associate to the network which is known as 
MAC address filtering.  What this results in is a gradual escalation of security that 
prevents your average wireless computer user from accessing your network.  The natural 
next step is to implement WEP which is meant to protect data as it traverses the wireless 
medium using the RC4 cryptographic cipher.  Although WEP has been soundly defeated 
from different angles, it is yet another attempt to slow down an attacker that may or may 
not have the knowledge required to crack WEP.  So the question remains, is WEP good 
enough? 
 
2. WEP Attack 
WEP has been proven to be extremely weak due to the repeated use of 
Initialization Vectors (IV) which are combined with a secret key to form a 128 bit WEP 
key at its strongest implementation.  Using this weakness, a relatively simple program 
can extract a WEP key which allows an attacker onto the network.  Figure 2 displays a 
screenshot from the authors in which a WEP crack was done on a Department of Defense 
(DoD) wireless network with a 64 bit key.  Figure 3 displays a WEP crack that was done 
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on a Department of Defense (DoD) wireless network with a 128 bit key.  In this instance 
of the attack, it took approximately 2 hours but with only a few users connected to the 
access point, there was a small amount of data useable in order to crack the WEP.  
Conversely, if an AP has 20 to 30 users connected to it accessing higher volumes of data, 
the attack could be done in roughly half the time or approximately one hour.  This attack 
has become more refined recently and there is even an open source Graphical User 
Interface (GUI) called AirSnort by The Shmoo Group which does most of the work for 
you.  Of course most of this must be done on a Unix or Linux operating system but some 
of these tools, including AirSnort, have been ported to Windows and are very difficult to 





Figure 2.   WEP attack using Aircrack 64 bit key (From Ref. 5) 
                                                 




Figure 3.   WEP attack using Aircrack 128 bit key (From Ref. 6) 
 
a. Countermeasures to WEP Attacks 
The best solution is to employ IEEE 802.1x/EAP port-based 
authentication and encryption mechanisms such as WiFi Protected Access (WPA2) or 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).  In addition, Virtual Private Networks (VPN) are 
extremely effective in preventing unauthorized access if implemented correctly.  The 
802.11i standard will attempt to eliminate all security weaknesses associated with WEP 
and provide an alternative to VPN usage. 
 
                                                 
6Adam K. Kessel, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Aircrack Screen Shot, August 2, 2005. 
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3. Rogue Access Points and Man-in-the-Middle Attacks 
Rogue access points are the most often occurring security threat generally 
stemming from the insider of an organization.  This is often done to allow mobile internet 
access to a particular workspace.  While creating a comfortable environment for this 
particular user, what they generally do not realize is that they are subverting all security 
procedures by providing easy access to an otherwise secure network.  The other 
possibility is an outsider that is able to gain access into an organization and set up an AP 
which can provide a back door into the wired network.  This is particularly devastating 
because without any wireless intrusion detection devices, an outsider could have access 
to the network for an extended amount of time while going undetected from the outside. 
The most commonly understood attack is one that involves clients associating 
with an AP that is different from the one they thought they were connected to.  A 
common scenario is the wireless internet café where a laptop user trusts that he or she is 
connecting to the café’s wireless internet service.  With a laptop or even a PDA, an 
attacker can use one network card to knock the user off the AP with a simple Denial of 
Service (DoS) attack and one to act as the legitimate AP using a program that duplicates 
an AP running in Master mode.  In this attack, an unsuspecting user could be connecting 
to an attacker’s computer while transmitting sensitive information such as login 
credentials, WEP information, or worse, sensitive financial account data. 
 
a. Countermeasures to Rogue APs and Man-in-the-Middle Attacks 
An organization must continue to employ a combination of existing 
wireless security mechanisms in order to prevent more advanced attacks.  Wireless 
Intrusion Detection Systems help to alert system administrators when unusual, suspect, or 
unauthorized traffic patterns exist.  New features of the IDS allow automatic termination 
of an unauthorized AP or client on the network which allows administrators to focus on 
locating and eliminating the intruder rather than attempting to contain the attacker’s 
access.  In addition, most IDSs keep logs of all activity on the network which can be 
useful for reviewing and preventing future attacks.  Some attacks are virtually 
unstoppable at this point in time because there is no way to guard the airwaves.  This type 
of attack, known as Denial of Service (DoS), will be examined further in the next section. 
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4. Denial of Service Attacks (DoS) 
The most dangerous attacks against mission critical wireless networks come from 
Denial of Service attacks.  As mentioned previously, due to the nature of the radio 
frequency (RF) medium and the design of the 802.11 protocols, wireless networks cannot 
be protected against Layer 1 and certain Layer 2 DoS attacks7.  There are a surprising 
number of different ways to implement a DoS attack which makes it even more difficult 
to defend against.  The most basic DoS attack is a physical layer attack which is also 
know as RF jamming.  There are two kinds of physical layer DoS attacks.  The first is 
known as RF jamming and is implemented by generating a high power radio frequency 
signal that overpowers any other RF signals on the wireless medium preventing other 
signals from access.  A DoS attacker must be actively transmitting a signal and within 
range to affect wireless devices.  In this case, the only hardware needed is some type of 
custom-built transmitter that floods selected channels with high power RF signal in order 
to fill that specific area of the spectrum.  This prevents any other logical use of the 
wireless medium because it is basically used up.  The other physical layer attack involves 
the crafting of legitimate packets that attack the 802.11 physical carrier sense algorithm. 
Another attack involves spoofing the Disassociation and Deauthentication frames 
which are used in the 802.11 protocol when setting up and tearing down a connection.  
This type of attack is probably the most well-known and used DoS attack on WLANs8.  
This attack floods the wireless medium with frames that knock clients off the network.  In 
addition, a spoofed and modified authentication frame will cause a client to become 
disassociated and generally causes erratic behavior.  Most of the DoS attacks are 
implemented by either modifying or flooding the wireless medium with legitimate frames 
used in the 802.11 protocol.  
 
a. Countermeasures to DoS Attacks 
One defense against layer 3 DoS attacks is in the 802.11i implementation 
which is protected with Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP).  Of course a DoS attack 
                                                 
7A.A. Vladimirov, K.V.  Gavrilenko, A.A. Mikhailovsky, (2004), WI-FOO: The Secrets of Wireless 
Hacking, (chap. 8, pp. 192-197), Addison-Wesley. 
8Ibid., para. 2. 
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used against this type of network corrupts the TKIP Michael message integrity checksum 
which causes the receiver to shut the connection down for a minute while it generates a 
new session key.  This is not very easy to do and is not very well documented either. 
 
5. Bluetooth Attacks 
Bluetooth is a wireless specification that uses short-range radio and was designed 
to be used within approximately 30 feet.  Bluetooth is an industry specification for short-
range RF-based connectivity for portable personal devices.  The IEEE Project 802.15.1 
has derived a Wireless Personal Area Network standard based on the Bluetooth v1.1 
Foundation Specifications9. One major security issue is the fact that the Bluetooth 
standard allows a single device to communicate simultaneously with multiple other 
devices.  Many Bluetooth radios are embedded in devices and users often do not realize 
whether they are on or even that they have a Bluetooth device to begin with.  Bluetooth 
attacks can permit network sniffing, device detection, data and services theft. 
Two well known attacks on Bluetooth devices are called Bluesnarfing and 
Bluejacking.  Bluesnarfing attackers are exploiting a problem with some implementations 
of the object exchange (OBEX) protocol, which is commonly used to exchange 
information between wireless devices. An attacker can synchronize with the victim's 
device (this is known as pairing) and gain access to any information or service available 
to the legitimate user.  Bluejacking is the practice of sending messages between mobile 
users using a Bluetooth wireless connection. People using Bluetooth-enabled mobile 
phones and PDAs can send messages, including pictures, to any other user within a 10-
meter or so range10. 
 
a. Countermeasures to Bluetooth Attacks 
Bluetooth should always be disabled unless it is being used and when it is 
being used, most versions allow you to turn discovery of your device off.  In addition, 
                                                 
9IEEE, IEEE 802.15 WPAN Task Group 1, http://www.ieee802.org/15/pub/TG1.html, Retrieved 
August 19, 2005. 
10searchMobileComputing.com, Definitions, 
http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,290660,sid40_gci961342,00.html, Retrieved 
August 8, 2005. 
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your firmware should be the most current according to the manufacturer.  The best 
solution is to use high level authentication and ensure Bluetooth communication is only 
over encrypted links to prevent sniffing and theft. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
 Although there are many useful mechanisms available to secure wireless 
networks, there is no out of the box solution which is why many wireless experts agree 
that within the wireless arena, it is still considered “The Wild West.”  The identified 
threats are always increasing, vulnerabilities are discovered every day, and the attacks are 
becoming simpler and more automated.  The key to combat this uphill battle is staying 




III. WLAN NETWORK SECURITY PRINCIPLES 
A. INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION SECURITY 
 
1. The Need for Security in Networking 
Given the threats and vulnerabilities discussed in the previous chapter, it is 
important to understand the basic principles of network security that help us mitigate 
those threats.   Security is a general concept that most rational individuals would agree is 
a good idea.  The problem is that security usually comes at a price and that price can be 
measured squarely in terms of convenience.  For example, if you want your home to be a 
safe place for those who live there, you must incorporate the necessary security measures.  
Those security measures might include rudimentary physical deterrents like fences and 
doors or more complex security measures like alarm systems and close circuit television 
technologies.  Those security measures will likely improve the security posture of your 
home.  However, those same security measures will levy inconveniences upon your 
family who now must unlock doors and disable alarms when moving throughout your 
home.   
The world of computer networking is similar, in that, the amount and complexity 
of security measures that you employ have a direct impact on the convenience of network 
users. So the more secure of a network environment that you desire, the more 
convenience is reduced for those that operate within that environment.  While most 
people desire security they insist upon convenience.  Therein lies the fundamental 
conflict between security and convenience which forms the foundation for WLAN 
security.  Convenience is after all one of the primary reasons we use and rely so heavily 
upon wireless technologies today. 
 
B.  INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
Information Assurance can be defined as measures used to protect and defend 
information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality and non-repudiation.  This includes providing for 
restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection and reaction 
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capabilities.  Information Assurance is the security discipline that encompasses 
Communication Security (COMSEC), Information Security (INFOSEC), and the control 
of compromising emanations (TEMPEST) 11. 
 
C.   FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
There are three generally agreed upon principles that apply to all discussions 
related to the secure transmission of information.  These principles are Confidentiality, 
Integrity, and Availability and are frequently referred to using the acronym of CIA.  
Some proponents of network security have added the additional tenet of authenticity, 
thereby extending the acronym to CIAA.  It can be argued that the concerns of this 
additional principle are derived from integrity, but each will be covered in brief below.  
 
1. Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is a property with which information is not made available or 
disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes12. Confidentiality basically 
means keeping sensitive information in confidence or limited to certain individuals or 
organizations.  In network defense, it is critical to prevent unauthorized users from 
observing information that they either do not need or should not see.   In a wired network, 
confidentiality is often compromised by tapping into a network cable or other network 
resources.  The task of confidentiality is even more challenging in a wireless environment 
because access to the medium is not physically restricted.  In addition, it is often difficult 
to control the range of the transmitted wireless signals. 
 
2. Integrity 
The concept of integrity means that information is accurate and protected from 
unauthorized changes13.  Integrity translates into ensuring that information cannot be 
maliciously or accidentally altered without its owner’s or user’s knowledge.  In network 
                                                 
11Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 8100.2, (2004), Use of Wireless Devices, Services, and 
Technologies in the DOD Global Information Grid (GIG). 
12National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), (2002), Wireless Network Security; 802.11 
Bluetooth and Handheld Devices, (Special Publication 800-48). 
13United States Marine Corps (USMC) Information Assurance Operational Standard, (2005), 014 
Wireless Local Area Networks V 1.0, (USMC IA OPSTD 014). 
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defense it is imperative to prevent data traveling across a network to be corrupted or 
modified.  This task is made more difficult due to inherent weaknesses in the 802.11 
standard which does not include strong message integrity features14.  These 




The concept of availability means that information resources are readily available 
when they are required15.  Ensuring information is accessible in a reasonable amount of 
time is no small challenge to network administrators.  Both malicious and non-malicious 
users can reduce or deny the availability of network resources.  Availability, like the 
other information assurance concepts, is absolutely essential to wireless networks.   Once 
the transmission medium is limited or denied, the underlying and fundamental premises 
of wireless networks are usurped as communications become inefficient and ineffective.  
Availability can be jeopardized by innocent individuals monopolizing the medium or by 
unauthorized users orchestrating any number of denial of service attacks. 
 
4. Authenticity 
The concept of authenticity means to verify the identity of the user, device, or 
other entity in a computer system, often as a prerequisite to allowing access to resources 
in a system, and 2) to verify the integrity of data that has been stored, transmitted, or 
otherwise exposed to possible unauthorized modification16.  Another way to think about 
authenticity is that it is ensuring the stated originator of the information is in fact the true 
originator.  Authenticity is tied closely to the concept of integrity because data integrity 
guarantees that information is accurate. Since part of the verified data is the actual data 
source, it can be argued that authenticity is implied with integrity. 
 
                                                 
14National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), (2002), Wireless Network Security; 802.11 
Bluetooth and Handheld Devices, (Special Publication 800-48). 
15United States Marine Corps (USMC) Information Assurance Operational Standard, (2005), 014 
Wireless Local Area Networks V 1.0, (USMC IA OPSTD 014). 
16National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), (2002), Wireless Network Security; 802.11 
Bluetooth and Handheld Devices, (Special Publication 800-48). 
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D.  DEFENSE IN DEPTH 
DoD Directive 8500.1 directs the use of a Defense in Depth approach as a means 
of protecting network infrastructure through a series of defense mechanisms which 
provide a multi-layered approach to network security.  Defense in Depth assumes that 
even the best technology will have inherent flaws or limitations which could be exploited 
given enough time, interest or resources from prospective hackers.  Having multiple 
layers of defense ensure gaps in one security technology are adequately covered by the 
strengths in another technology.  For example, using an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
is one way to monitor activity on a network.  However, wired and wireless IDSs come in 
many different forms which include both signature and behavior based tools.  A good 
defensive posture would include behavior and signature based applications so that both 
new and old attacks can be recognized and prevented.  In addition, Defense in Depth 
means using other defensive mechanisms like firewalls, encryption schemes, and strong 
authentication protocols coupled with those different types of IDS’s.  Since there are a 
multitude of methods and levels of attackers, no single strategy or mechanism can 
completely protect a network.  Each method and every type of attacker presents unique 
challenges to the secure network.  This multi- layered approach to network defense will 
not guarantee the safety of your network, but it will harden your network and provide 
enough deterrence to prevent most attackers and significantly slow down more advanced 
adversaries.  While the concept of slowing down potential hackers may not provide much 
comfort to network administrators, a properly implemented defense in depth philosophy 
may provide just enough time to recognize, foil and protect critical information 
infrastructure from an attack. 
 
E. ENCRYPTION AND FILTERING 
There are generally two mechanisms which can be used to secure local area 
networks: encryption and filtration.  Most security professionals are strong advocates for 
one methodology or the other.  Good security professionals will practice the concepts of 
defense in depth and incorporate both mechanisms into the security plan.  Each approach 
is designed for a particular scenario as described below: 
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1.   Encryption  
Encryption can be defined as the process for obscuring information in order to 
make it unreadable without “special knowledge”.  The concept of cryptography or using 
codes to conceal and protect important information has been practiced by individuals for 
hundreds of years.  However, its use was not widespread until government agencies 
began implementing it during the 1970’s.  Encryption is the primary means for securing 
traffic on a network.  Valid traffic needs encryption to protect the confidentiality, 
integrity and authenticity of each packet. Encryption uses algorithms or ciphers to 
transform information known as plain text into an encrypted form known as cipher text.  
The ciphers or algorithms commonly use a metric known as a key to encrypt and decrypt 
data that flows through an encrypted network17.   
 
2.   Filtering 
 The concept of filtering is used by intrusion detection systems, firewalls and 
device access control lists to identify packets that could be harmful to your network.  
These “bad bits” never reach critical communication infrastructure because they are 
appropriately identified and turned away from your network through the use of packet 
filtering.  Packet filtering breaks down data packets into individual bits of data for the 
purposes of determining what to do with the payload portion of the packet.  Packet 
filtering seeks to recognize protocols, port numbers, purpose of traffic, source of traffic, 
destination of traffic, not to mention specific data that is contained within the traffic.  It 
involves the process of applying security policies to all traffic that attempts to enter or 
leave the network.  When “bad bits” fail authentication or match a specific deny rule or 
fail to match a specific permit rule they are dropped from the network18. In general, there 
are two different types of packet filtering; stateless and stateful.  Stateless filtering is less 
expensive and least complex of the two.  It provides high volume course granularity 
filtering with no maintenance of state information.  For this reason it is also referred to as 
static filtering because packets are dealt with individually with no regard for relationship 
                                                 
17WikiPedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encryption, Retrieved July 27, 
2004. 
18J.D. Fulp, (2004), Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research, Course Notes for 
CS3690 Network Security, Naval Postgraduate School. 
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or correlation to previous or future packets.   Stateless or static packet filtering only 
evaluates information found in layer 3 or layer 4 headers.  In contrast, stateful filtering 
maintains information about each packet in a table and references that table in order to 
make decisions on how to handle future traffic.  Because of this more detailed analysis of 
each packet, stateful filtering impacts the efficiency of traffic flow across your network.  
However, the value of stateful packet filtering should not only be measured in terms of 
how long it takes traffic to flow across your network.  The tradeoffs between convenience 
and security demand that latency concerns are balanced with security concerns.  
Ultimately, packet filtering will be measured by how well it protects your network from 
the myriad threats and attacks mentioned in Chapter 2. 
  
F. WIRELESS NETWORK DEFENSE 
The mobility, flexibility and costs associated with WLANs are making wireless 
network implementations more and more popular.  However, WLANs have some unique 
differences and challenges from the wired network that must be overcome in order to 
secure network traffic.  Local Area Networks are bound physically by wired cables and 
can be secured by managing access to the physical medium.  Wireless networks are not 
bound by wires or even by walls.  When network transmissions travel through the air they 
are susceptible to being viewed, altered or even denied by any individual with access to 
the radio frequency spectrum.  The radio frequency spectrum is a shared medium which 




One of the first security principles that must be addressed in a WLAN is the issue 
of encryption.  With traffic flowing freely through the air, network administrators must 
choose an encryption scheme to protect critical information from being viewed.   One of 
the first and most common encryption schemes available is Wired Equivalent Privacy 
(WEP).  WEP was designed to provide wireless networks with the same level of 
protection that was available to wired networks.  WEP is a protocol that uses a series of 
secret user keys and system generated values to provide 64 or 128 bit encryption for 
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wireless networks.  While WEP is the most common data encryption scheme used to 
protect WLANs today, it proved to be very susceptible to password cracking and replay 
attacks.  These and other weaknesses in the WEP protocol have led to updated encryption 
schemes like WiFi Protected Access (WPA).  WPA was created to be backwards 
compatible with WEP features to enable it to be use with both newer and older versions 
of hardware.  WPA leverages a substantially larger initialization vector (IV) to 
accompany its 128 bit keys.  In addition, WPA employs options for the use of either 
Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) or Advanced Encryption Scheme (AES) which 
dramatically increases the number of keys in use in addition to a strong Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) to prevent replay attacks19. 
 
2. Access to the WLAN 
There are a few relatively simple steps that can be implemented to limit access to 
a wireless network.  These steps are listed below: 
 
a. MAC Filtering  
All network devices have Media Access Control (MAC) addresses that 
uniquely identify them on a network.  Configuring your router or access point to only 
allow traffic from specific MAC addresses to travel on the WLAN is easy way to enforce 
access control.   This will allow only these specific users to associate and connect to the 
wireless network.  While these addresses can be spoofed, the application of MAC 
filtering is a good starting point for keeping unauthorized users off the WLAN.   
 
b. Manage SSID 
Wireless devices must use Service Set Identifiers (SSIDs) in order to 
uniquely identify and differentiate themselves within a wireless architecture.  The SSID 
is initially set to a default value by the manufacturer of a wireless router or access point.  
These default values are common knowledge among network administrators as well as 
                                                 
19Planet3 Wireless Inc., (2005), Certified Wireless Network Administrator (CWNA) Study Guide, New 
York; McGraw-Hill Osborne. 
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potential hackers.  The default SSID should be changed from the default value to another 
generic term that does not provide more information about the network.  In addition, 
wireless routers or APs automatically broadcast the SSID to the rest of the world.  
However, these devices have the option that enables individuals to turn off the 
“Broadcast SSID” option.  
 
c. Disable DHCP  
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) assigns IP addresses to all 
devices that connect to the network.  Once users have IP addresses they are able to gain 
other information about the network like IP ranges and DNS servers.  By disabling 
DHCP, network administrators are forced to assign static IP addresses to all users which 
can be tedious in large networks but it is another line of defense against network 
intruders. 
 
d.  Manage Signal Strength 
Managing signal availability in a WLAN is another fundamental step that 
network administrators should take to secure wireless networks.  Signal strength should 
be monitored to limit the availability of the signal to only necessary workspaces.  Using 
maximum signal strength in a small office environment may enable access to your 
WLAN from unsecure parking lots and streets which could be nearby.  In addition, APs 
should be turned off when not in use to further limit the availability of your WLAN’s 
signal from unauthorized users.  Administrators routinely limit access to wired network 
resources to within working hours, which is why wireless infrastructure should be 
regulated in similar fashion. 
 
e. Change Configuration Passwords and Default Accounts 
Wireless network devices, such as routers and access points have 
administrator accounts which are established to enable the WLAN administrator to 
configure the device.  These accounts also have default passwords which can be obtained 
easily on the Internet.  These administrator accounts should be renamed and the default 
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passwords should be changed to prevent potential hackers from accessing and re-
configuring devices on the WLAN.  
 
f. Update Firmware and Drivers 
Manufacturers of Wireless Network Interface Cards (NICs) and access 
points routinely publish updates to firmware and drivers.  The updates often contain 
improvements to the functionality of the devices but can also correct vulnerabilities that 
have been identified in their devices.  These vulnerabilities represent security holes that 
can be exploited by attackers if the appropriate patches are not applied. 
 
3. Firewalls 
Encrypting data and managing access to the wireless medium are not enough to 
keep the WLAN secure from all the emerging threats discussed in the first chapter.  
Firewalls or gateways are yet another way to limit “bad guys” or “bad data” from 
entering your network.  Firewalls are software and hardware solutions that filter the data 
that enters and exits the network.  There are many different categories of firewalls, some 
of the most common types are packet-filtering gateways, circuit-level gateways and 
application-level gateways.  Each of these different types of firewalls are designed to 
examine data at different layers in the OSI model.  For example, packet filtering firewalls 
generally review traffic at the network or transport levels.  This level of examination 
allows the firewall to filter traffic based on critical information found within the TCP and 
IP packet headers.  TCP and IP packet headers will indicate source and destination 
addresses, source and destination port numbers, along with the protocol type20.  
Regardless of the type or types of firewall(s) that are implemented to protect your 
network, they all serve the purpose of controlling access to or from a protected network.  
Depending on the security requirements and policies for a particular network, several 
types of firewalls can be employed.  For example, it is not uncommon for a network 
infrastructure to employ packet filtering firewalls, proxy servers serving as circuit level 
gateways, and application level firewalls to limit access to the network.  The use of 
                                                 
20John Mairs, (2002), VPNs: A Beginner’s Guide, New York; McGraw-Hill Osborne. 
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multiple categories of firewalls adds yet another level of defense in depth and serves to 
significantly harden your network infrastructure. 
 
4. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
The use of wireless IDSs and other network monitors are yet another way to 
improve the security of your WLAN.  These software tools help to enforce organizational 
wireless policies and ultimately protect sensitive data on your network.  A wireless IDS 
will provide warnings through the use of alarms which are triggered when your wireless 
security policies and/or rules are broken.  These alerts allow for real time monitoring and 
response to unusual activity on the WLAN.  In addition to signaling unusual, suspect, or 
unauthorized traffic patterns, most IDSs keep logs of all activity on the network which 
can be useful for reviewing and preventing future attacks, and troubleshooting 
connectivity problems not to mention measuring the performance of the wireless 
network. 
 
G.  SUMMARY 
Leveraging the benefits of wireless technology means incurring significant risks 
to critical information infrastructure. The purpose of this chapter was to introduce 
network security principles and fundamental WLAN defense mechanisms.  These basic 
principles and tools will provide the foundation for mitigating the risks outlined in the 
first chapter.  Individuals using a network to communicate must be assured of the data’s 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity.  This information assurance is 
achieved through a security policy which is based upon a rigorous philosophy of defense 
in depth.  In addition, the network defense plan will include the use of encryption to 
protect legitimate data along with a variety of traffic filtering technologies to prevent 
suspicious or illegitimate data within critical networks.  These principles are the critical 
building blocks for the wireless network solutions outlined in subsequent chapters of this 







IV. MARINE CORPS WIRELESS IMPLEMENTATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION   
The Marine Corps is currently using and/or exploring the use of WLAN 
technologies in several different applications.  The majority of these wireless applications 
leverage technologies other than 802.11b. In the tactical communication arena there are 
numerous initiatives leveraging other wireless protocols aimed at improving command 
and control on the battlefield.  For example, Marine Corps Systems Command and 
Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA) are collaborating on the use 
of 802.16 networks as a data distribution system in Iraq.  The Marine Corps is also 
exploring prototype over-the-horizon communications systems and a mobile command 
post system.  There are also initiatives which couple the use of 802.11b and SECNET-11 
encryption technology to provide secure unclassified and classified wireless networks in 
support of Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Command Operational Center (COC) 
missions.  One of the initial wireless implementations in the Marine Corps was 
introduced to improve logistical support for the operating forces.  This adaptation of a 
Warehouse Management System (WMS) has proven to dramatically improve the 
efficiency and reliability within the supply chain, in addition to significant decreases in 
the required administration by of supply warehouse personnel.       Regardless of the 
protocol, each of these wireless initiatives are designed to help the Marine Corps leverage 
technology to become more mobile and more connected. 
 
B. SECNET-11 
The Marine Corps is currently exploring Harris Corporation’s SECNET-11 
Personal Computer (PC) Card technology to provide secure wireless data, video, and 
Voice over IP (VoIP) capabilities.  SECNET-11 is the only NSA certified 802.11b 
application due to its ability to provide Type 1 cryptography to secure data and network 
header information for all network layers.  In other words, the entire packet is encrypted 
which prevents potential adversaries from gaining information from intercepted traffic 
analysis.   The use of SECNET -11 PC Cards to provide secure communication up to the 
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Secret level significantly reduces the set-up time, cost and bulk of externally wired 
encryption equipment.   
SECNET-11 cards can be used to connect wireless users together using the same 
SSID, channel and traffic encryption key.  This configuration allows individual laptops to 
communicate with each other without an accompanying network infrastructure.  Figure 4 
below shows the use of SECNET-11 cards in Ad Hoc Mode creating a typical Ad Hoc 
Network.   
 
Figure 4.   SECNET-11 PC Cards to Create Ad Hoc Network (From Ref21) 
 
 
When SECNET-11 Wireless Bridges are added to the Ad Hoc configuration you 
are able to create an Infrastructure Network.  The SECNET-11 bridges can be configured 
in access point or bridge mode.  The access point configuration uses the bridge much like 
a hub and links all stations together.  The bridge mode supports point to point 
communications between individual wireless users.  An example of this infrastructure 
configuration is displayed below in Figure 5. 
                                                 
21Harris Secure Communications, Secure Wireless Local Area Network, 
http://download.harris.com/app/public_download.asp?fid=843, Retrieved August 6, 2005. 
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Figure 5.   SECNET-11 PC Cards to Create Infrastructure Network (From Ref. 22) 
 
As seen in Figure 6, SecNet-11 Wireless Bridges can be used to transmit secure 
data up to ranges of 10 miles with the use of external antennas and/or amplifiers.  This 
capability significantly increases the usefulness and application in tactical environments 
when data can be secured over extended ranges as seen in the below representation. 
 
Figure 6.   Use of SECNET-11 PC Wireless Bridges (From Ref. 23) 
 
                                                 
22Harris Secure Communications, Secure Wireless Local Area Network, 
http://download.harris.com/app/public_download.asp?fid=843, Retrieved August 6, 2005. 
23Ibid. 
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The Marine Corps has several current and future initiatives tied to the use of 
SECNET-11 technology.  SECNET-11 has been used by U.S. Conventional and Special 
Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The Marine Corps recently used a large scale 
implementation during tsunami relief efforts in Thailand in early 2005 to enhance the 
secure communications with the Command and Control Headquarters.  Regardless of 
configuration, SECNET-11 provides Type 1 encryption to secure transmission of data at 
rates up 11 Mbps using the 802.11b protocol.   
 
C. STRATIS 
STRATIS is an acronym for STorage, Retrieval, Automated Tracking, Integrated 
System (STRATIS).  It integrates radio frequency (RF) equipment for “real time” 
communication with a supply database while on the warehouse floor.  STRATIS is 
application software known as a WMS which performs real time operations, directs and 
manages labor, maximizes equipment utilization and tracks and controls inventory.  This 
system will operate in conjunction with a host system such as Supported Activity Supply 
System (SASSY) or Asset Tracking for Logistics and Supply Systems (ATLASS) 
Version II+.  The host system provides data such as using unit demands to the WMS and 
the WMS provides data such as inventory balances and the status of using unit demands 
back to the host.  The WMS also controls and tracks the actions occurring on the 
warehouse floor.   
STRATIS operator workstations are either fixed computer workstations on a 
carousel lift station, in the receiving section, on a supervisor’s desk or a radio frequency 
communication (RF) hand-held terminal. 
 
1. History and Purpose  
STRATIS is a computer based transaction oriented process control system, which 
provides constant tracking and control of material at all stages in the physical distribution 
process24.  STRATIS is used to perform receiving, request and issue processing, 
warehouse inventory, shelf-life management, material tracking, re-warehousing, 
                                                 
24SG Automation, (2000), STRATIS Functional Description. 
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reconciliation,  end of day processing, and a whole host of management control functions.  
The STRATIS project is sponsored by Marine Corps Systems Command for use by 
Marine Corps Activities.  STRATIS was originally implemented at Camp Lejeune, North 
Carolina in January of 1998 as a “prototype” warehouse control system.  The system was 
upgraded and re-hosted from a Tandem mid-range platform to a PC based platform.  
STRATIS was implemented at MCB Camp Pendleton, CA in March 2001, at 3rd Material 
Readiness Battalion (MRB) Camp Kinser, Okinawa, Japan in February 2003, and at 
MCBH, Hawaii in March 200325.  Based on its success, the re-hosted STRATIS was 
implemented at other Marine Corps Activities. 
 
2. Requirements and Capabilities 
STRATIS was designed to provide the following major measurable objectives26: 
• Control 100,000 stock numbers and 70,000 mechanized storage locations. 
• Process and stow 700 receipts per eight hour day. 
• Process and pick 1,400 issues per eight hour day. 
• Pack 1,400 issues per eight hour day at the consolidation and single item 
packing stations. 
• Delivery 1,400 issues per eight hour day using the Consolidation 
Manifesting and Transportation System (CMATS). 
• Provide on-line interface capability with the Marine Corps SASSY 
system. 
• Provide software for total tracking and control of all transactions. 
• Maintain real-time update of all material balances by location. 
• Assign stow locations within the mechanized warehouse in real-time and 
to improve cube utilization. 
• Provide management and supervisory information to allow control through 
corrective adjustments to the system. 
• Provide process controlled automation for all warehouse distribution 
functions including receiving, stowing, picking, packing, and 
consolidation.  
• Print issue documents, packing lists, and packing and stow labels. 
                                                 





3. Controls and Threat Description 
 
a. Access 
STRATIS has several different types of controls to limit access to the 
system.  Employees access the system with individually assigned employee identification 
numbers and passwords.  Supervisors assign employee identification numbers along with 
access privileges which determine the type of functions that each employee can perform 
in the system.  Employees can be assigned any one of twenty different security levels that 
create access to different sets or groups of functions.  Authorization to access STRATIS 
is verified each time an employee signs in.  
 
b. Threats 
STRATIS, like the majority of other government systems is vulnerable to 
a wide assortment of threats.  There are threats to the confidentiality and integrity of the 
data processed, stored, and transmitted by the system.  Additional threats exist to the 
availability of the assets of the system to assist in executing the STRATIS mission.  
Threats are from those who would target STRATIS for espionage, criminal activity, 
unlawful use, denial of service, or malicious harm.  External or internal threats include 
espionage, terrorist, hackers, and vandals.  The most likely incident involves an 
authorized user who accidentally or inadvertently commits or omits some action that 
damages or compromises the system, one of its components, or information processed, 
stored, or transmitted by the system.  The next most likely incident involves an 
authorized user who takes deliberate action to damage the system, one of its components, 
or its data for personal gain or vengeful reasons.  Such a person could also engage in 
espionage, other criminal activity, or exploitation or expropriation of the assets of the 
system for personal gain27. 
 
                                                 
27Marine Corps Systems Command, (2001), STRATIS Secure System Authorization Agreement 
Outline. 
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4. Hardware Architecture 
 
Figure 7.   STRATIS Architectural Description (From Ref. 28) 
 
5. Deployable Configuration 
The success of STRATIS in garrison has led the Marine Corps to further explore 
its application in deployed tactical environments.  A more portable and “ruggedized” 
version of STRATIS has already been deployed to Iraq in an attempt to decrease errors 
and increase efficiency within supply operations. This automated inventory control 
system is scaled down but still possesses enough capabilities to manage inventory at a 
dock, vehicle park, warehouse or aboard ship.  Figure 8 reflects the scaled down version 
consisting of a single wireless access point, two “ruggedized” handheld portable RF 
devices, printer, docking stations, along with the requisite cables and manuals, which can 
all be secured in a padded metal suitcase.   
                                                 




Figure 8.   Deployable STRATIS Configuration (From Ref. 29) 
 
These deployable implementations are not intended for the front lines of combat 
operations.  Inventory control is typically conducted in the rear where vital combat 
service support channels can be protected.  However, with the success and obvious 
improvements to supply chain accuracy and efficiency, STRATIS will be used closer and 
closer to the battlefield.  
 
D. SUMMARY 
The Marine Corps has leveraged 802.11 WLAN technologies for use in several 
critical applications.  These applications possess different vulnerabilities due to the 
various configurations and encryption methodologies.  The STRATIS system has been in 
operation longer than SECNET-11 but is still a relatively immature wireless 
implementation.  It was developed with a priority on logistical support vice security.  The 
SECNET-11 PC Card and Wireless Bridge technology was developed from the 
perspective of security from its inception.  While both implementations use the same 
                                                 
29John Cox, (2002), Marine Tackle Paperwork with Wireless LAN, Network World, Retrieved August 
2, 2005, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2002/132978_06-03-2002. 
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802.11b protocol, they are distinct in their approach to security.  One leverages relatively 
weak encryption schemes while the other employs Type 1 Encryption which is required 
by the DoD WLAN policy to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of wireless 
transmissions.   The vulnerabilities inherent in the STRATIS application make it an ideal 
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V. WIRELESS VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS  
A. INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the results of several DoD vulnerability 
assessments that were conducted during the course of our research.  These assessments 
each present distinct characteristics that are worthy of consideration when determining 
standard procedures for assessing and securing WLANs.  In addition, each of these 
assessments demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of specific software and hardware 
tools for the purposes of conducting WLAN vulnerability assessment and monitoring 
enterprise WLAN assets.  A total of three organizations were assessed with emphasis 
placed on Marine Corps installations.  A Joint Command was also assessed in order to 
compare with the Marine Corps installations. 
 
1. Assessment Tools 
There is a wide assortment of tools that are available to conduct vulnerability 
assessments.  During the course of our research we used several open source or 
shareware tools to gain useful information about WLANs.  NetStumbler, a Windows 
based program used to provide basic WLAN discovery data, along with more advanced 
LINUX based tools like Kismet and Ethereal are the most popular open sourced tools that 
were used to conduct our research.  There are obviously multiple WLAN tools which can 
be purchased for WLAN assessment and monitoring.  We frequently used various 
versions of Airopeek, AirMagnet, and Air Defense for our WLAN traffic analysis.  In 
addition, our research required the use of Yellowjacket, a WLAN analyzer with a 
directional finding capability by Berkeley Varitronics Systems.  Each of these tools 
played an integral role in our assessments.  These and other tools will be described and 






B. ORGANIZATION ONE  
 
1. Background 
Organization One is a tenant command on a medium sized installation which was 
relatively isolated by natural security features of mountain and water boundaries.  
Civilian and military populations were employed at the installation.  The primary threats 
posed to the organization and installation as a whole was insiders or external threats 
equipped with high gain antennas.  Unclassified, Classified and higher level networks 
were resident at the installation.  Organization One was selected due to the recent 
implementation of a wireless inventory management system, known as STRATIS.   The 
host installation was not aware of any wireless activity on the installation at the time of 
the assessment. 
   
2. Wireless Discovery 
The assessment was completed in May of 2004.  There were no approved wireless 
implementations at the time; however the organization had a limited compliance waiver 
which authorized operation of STRATIS at the time of the assessment.  STRATIS was 
the only wireless activity that was found at the installation during the assessment.  The 
following checklist represents a short list of wireless attributes observed during the 
wireless discovery phase. 
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DSSS  FHSS  Bluetooth  Broadband  
 






















Number   __6__ 
 
Vendor(s)   1)  Symbol 
 
 
MAC Filtering   Yes   No 
 
 Physical Access   Yes   No 
 
 Configuration Access   Wired   Wireless 
 
 Excessive Signal Strength   Yes   No   




 Type(s)   _Omni-directional__ 






Number   _18__  
 
Type(s)   1)  Symbol handhelds 
 
    2)  Laptops 
 






Names of ESSIDs  1)  22     4) 
  
    2)     5) 
    
    3)     6) 
 




Type    _None_ 
 
 














a. NetStumbler - WLAN Basics 
We used an open source tool known as NetStumbler to get some basic 
information about the network.  Figure 9 is a screen shot taken during the assessment 
used to confirm the MAC Addresses of the access points, the SSID, the channels being 
used, as well as, the vendor who produced the access point.   
 
 
Figure 9.   NetStumbler Discovery at Organization One (From Ref. 30) 
 
b. Yellowjacket - Locating and Signal Accessibility 
Given basic information about the wireless network, we used 
YellowJacket directional finding 802.11b Network Analyzer to locate the APs and 
determine signal accessibility.  Yellow Jacket was very effective at physically locating 
                                                 
30Shane Goodwin, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, NetStumbler Screen Shot, May 20, 
2004. 
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each AP.  Three of the six APs were found in locations different from their original 
planned location.  This may have been done to increase signal area, however with the 
small size of this facility and the strength of each AP, this should not have been a 
problem.  It seems most likely that the installer felt it necessary to separate the AP’s by a 
greater distance than originally planned to create a more symmetrical layout. One of the 
APs, AP 1 (00:AO:F8:4D:10:DA), was found to have an exceptionally low signal 
strength.  Three of the units had two omni direction antenna attached directly to the unit 
in the standard fashion. Three other APs were equipped with nonstandard antennas.  The 
APs with non standard antennas had one omni directional attached directly to the unit and 
another longer outdoor omni directional antenna attached a few feet away.  The antennas 
are likely used to account for coverage area lost due to steel and concrete beams near the 
installation point.  These antennas indicated greater signal strength in all cases except 
one.  The outside antenna associated with AP 4 (00:AO:F8:4D:11:15) was separated by 
approximately four feet, concrete and steel beams, and windows from the standard omni 
directional antenna attached directly to the unit. AP 4’s nonstandard omni directional 
antenna showed an extremely weak signal that was likely from the other antenna.  This 
antenna is probably nonfunctional. 
 
4. Results  
 
a. AirMagnet – Advanced WLAN Assessment  
Given basic information about the wireless network, to include physical 
mapping of the network and signal accessibility, the next step was to try to gain access to 
the network.  NetStumbler reflected that the STRATIS implementation was not using 
WEP. This along with other useful information was confirmed using AirMagnet.  One of 
the helpful tools offered by AirMagnet is a series of warnings or alarms to assist WLAN 
administrators or hackers in identifying vulnerabilities.  AirMagnet identified the 
following vulnerabilities in Organization One’s WLAN: 
AP broadcasting SSID (22) in clear text.  For security reasons, it is 
generally recommended that the SSID broadcast be turned off in the AP configuration. 
Even though turning off SSID broadcast does not secure your WLAN by any definition, 
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it does prevent your AP from being discovered by war-driving tools such as NetStumbler.  
Turning off SSID broadcast also blocks out casual WLAN hackers who do not have 
sophisticated tools and knowledge.   
AP with WEP encryption disabled.  If a higher-level encryption 
mechanism such as VPN is not used, data exchange between this AP and its client 
stations is subject to eavesdropping by intruders.  In addition, unauthorized clients 
without encryption keys can associate with this AP and consume its resources.   
Client station with WEP encryption disabled.  If higher-level encryption 
mechanism is not used, WLAN data exchange with this client station is subject to 
eavesdropping by intruders.  In addition, this client station may accidentally associate 
with any AP outside your organization thus exposing sensitive information stored on the 




Figure 10.   AirMagnet Alarm Notification at Organization One (From Ref. 31) 
 
b.   WLAN Exploitation and Expanding Privileges 
Since the network did not have WEP enabled, we next attempted to gain 
access to STRATIS using a standard IPAQ with internal wireless card.  Figure 11 
displays the IPAQ Network Connections list of available networks by SSID.  
Organization One was broadcasting the SSID “22”.  We quickly connected to the 
network and gained access to the internet using the STRATIS wireless network. 
                                                 






Figure 11.   IPAQ Screenshot showing connection to SSID 22 (From Ref. 32) 
 
Once we associated to the network and gained access to the internet, we 
scanned the network to get a range of IP addresses for the STRATIS network.  With IP 
addresses in hand, we searched the internet for default AP configurations in our first 
attempt to increase privileges.  Figure 12 below shows the IP of one of the six access 
points which was plugged into the browser to display the Symbol Access Point 
configuration page.  This page shows basic system statistics with very little sensitive 
information other than the known access points, their IP addresses and MAC addresses.  
After attempting to click on any of the configuration links, you are prompted for a user 
name and password. 
 
                                                 
32Shane Goodwin, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, IPAQ Network Connections Screen 





Figure 12.   Symbol AP Configuration Webpage (From Ref. 33) 
 
In order to figure out the user name and password, the Symbol’s corporate 
web site was accessed.  The Symbol Access Point manual and reference guide, which is 
in Figure 13 below, contained the default settings. 
 
                                                 
33Shane Goodwin, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Symbol AP Configuration Webpage 




Figure 13.   Symbol Website Containing AP Configuration Guidelines  (From Ref. 34) 
 
After a quick document search of the reference manual, the default login 
and password were found.  The reference manual indicated that the default userid was 
Admin and the default password was Symbol.   Figure 14 is a screenshot from Symbol’s 
reference manual which documents this information.  
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Figure 14.   Symbol Reference Manual Reflecting Default AP Configuration (From Ref. 35) 
 
The next step was to attempt to use this default password.  As shown in 
the following Figures 15 and 16, the default userid and password allowed a connection to 
the STRATIS AP’s configuration page with full access to the configuration links.  This 
included access to encryption keys as well as modifying any option and setting the AP 
configuration password. 
                                                 
35Shane Goodwin, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Symbol AP Configuration Reference 








Figure 16.   Symbol AP Configuration Webpage (From Ref. 37) 
                                                 
36Shane Goodwin, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Symbol AP Configuration Webpage  
Screen Shot , May 19, 2004 
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From Figure 17, it was apparent that the telnet feature could be exploited.  
With the telnet logins enabled, an adversary could telnet to the access point and have the 
same control using the command prompt as with the web enabled configuration page.  
Figure 17 is a screenshot from the telnet interface.  From this interface, almost any 
desired configuration changes could be made to the AP.   This access represents a 









                                                 
37Shane Goodwin, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Symbol AP Configuration Webpage 
Screen Shot, May 19, 2004. 
38Shane Goodwin, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Symbol AP Configuration Telnet 
Screen Shot, May 19, 2004. 
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5. Recommendations 
Based on the poor security posture of Organization One’s STRATIS 
implementation there were many recommendations that could be made to improve 
security for the wireless network.   
a.   Turn Encryption On.  
 This will require individually configuring each of the access points as 
well as each handheld device that connects to this network.   
b.  Change the Default Password on Each Access Point.   
NSA currently recommends a minimum 12-character password using four 
different character sets.   
c. Turn the Broadcast Power Down.  
The STRATIS APs allow varying power settings. By setting the power to 
a lower level, the distance at which a signal may be accessible is reduced.  
d. Restrict Access to the Access Points by MAC Address.   
Each wireless device allowed to access the network must be identified to 
each access point.  Create an access control list for the APs to specifically authorize 
clients to communicate on the network. 
e. Do Not Broadcast the SSID. 
By broadcasting the SSID, a required piece of information to access the 
network is automatically provided to an unauthorized user.   
f. Separate STRATIS From the NIPRNET and Base Networks.  
Logically separate the STRATIS network.  Logically separate the wireless 
portion.  Physically separate building infrastructure.   
 
C. ORGANIZATION TWO 
 
1. Background 
Organization Two was carefully selected in order to compare results found from 
Organization One approximately two years later.  Both organizations are very similar 
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with regard to geography, military and civilian activity, authorized wireless networks and 
network size.  This particular organization has very few areas that are susceptible to the 
threat of off-base wireless scanning due to the majority of the units being tucked away in 
between very high elevation ridgelines.  Classified and Unclassified networks are resident 
on this installation with no wireless classified networks detected. 
 
2. Wireless Discovery 
In the time span of two years, between 2003 and 2005, not only has access to 
wireless equipment increased but the number of unauthorized WLANs on DoD 
installations has dramatically increased.  The Kismet scanner found over 75 different 
WLANs not including base housing.  A small amount of these are legitimate networks 
that have been authorized because they are not on the NIPR network and are operating in 
an official capacity such as the Commissary, Post Exchange, and specific financial relief 
organizations.  Otherwise, there are only two authorized WLANs allowed by the DAA on 
this installation with waivers because they do not abide by the Marine Corps’ wireless 
policy. 
The following checklist represents a short list of wireless attributes observed 
during the wireless discovery phase. 
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DSSS  FHSS  Bluetooth  Broadband  
 






















Number   __14__ 
 
Vendor(s)   1)  Symbol 
 
    2)  Linksys 
 
    3)  Netgear 
 
 
MAC Filtering   Yes   No 
 
 Physical Access   Yes   No 
 
 Configuration Access   Wired   Wireless 
 
 Excessive Signal Strength   Yes   No   





 Type(s)   _Omni-directional__ 





Number   _56__  
 
Type(s)   1)  Symbol handhelds 
 
    2)  Laptops 
 





Names of ESSIDs  1)  ESSID    4) 
  
    2)  linksys    5) 
    
    3)     6) 
 




Type    _WEP__ 
 
 
WEP   Yes   No   
 
Frequency of Key Changes _Monthly__ 
 
 
WPA   Yes  No  
 





 Type   _None__ 
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4. Results 
Overall, there were more wireless networks on this particular installation than on 
any other installation that was assessed.     
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the STRATIS wireless inventory system is 
of particular interest due to its unsecured implementation.  It was found that the 
STRATIS system on this installation did have WEP enabled.  This is an improvement 
from what was seen 2 years ago where the WLAN was wide open with no encryption or 
WEP enabled.  In addition, nothing was established to ensure RF signals did not 
propagate outside of the work area.  These vulnerabilities were addressed by 
Headquarters United States Marine Corps C4/IA with the STRATIS Wireless 
Networking Configuration message which states the requirements that each system must 
meet within 30 days of the release of the message. 
According to the message, “Wireless networking technologies are approved for 
use with the STRATIS system only when configured in accordance with the approved 
SSAA, wireless security best practices, and other DoD/DoN/USMC policies/procedures.  
If the wireless component of the STRATIS system is operated without the appropriate 
security measures in place, severe vulnerabilities would be introduced to the data, as well 
as the enterprise network.39”  In this case, STRATIS is approved for use in accordance 
with the Marine Corps Information Assurance Operational Standard40 that provides 
waivers for certain networks that the DAA deems appropriate.  This wireless network did 
not comply with the requirements within the message in a few different areas.  The 
message states that WPA should be enabled if available and WEP was still in place at this 
installation.  The Symbol website displayed firmware upgrades that were available with 
WPA security for certain APs but not for legacy devices which are installed in this case.  
This would require the replacement of old APs with newer technology and higher 
security features.  It is recommended that all organizations with the legacy APs installed, 
purchase new hardware that is certified to be compatible with the IEEE 802.11i standard 
which enables WPA security.  Finally, the WEP was being changed once a month which 
                                                 
39Jeffrey Watts, STRATIS message from Headquarters Marine Corps C4/IA, STRATIS Wireless 
Networking Configuration, July 2004. 
40United States Marine Corps (USMC) Information Assurance Operational Standard, (2005), 014 
Wireless Local Area Networks V 1.0, (USMC IA OPSTD 014). 
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is better than not changing at all but the message requires rotating the key weekly.  
Although this helps to ensure someone would not have access to the network for more 
than a week, most WEP implementations can be cracked very quickly due to one of the 
many weaknesses in WEP.  This security weakness involves the recovery of the secret 
key after intercepting and analyzing only a relatively small amount of traffic.  This attack 
is publicly available as an attack script and open source code41. 
Figures 18 and 19 display the Symbol Access Point web configuration Security 
Setup and Access Control List. 
 
Figure 18.   Symbol AP configuration Telnet Login enabled (From Ref. 42) 
                                                 
41National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), (2002), Wireless Network Security; 802.11 
Bluetooth and Handheld Devices, (Special Publication 800-48). 
42Adam K. Kessel, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Symbol AP Configuration Webpage 
Screen Shot, August 4 2005. 
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Figure 19.   Symbol AP Access Control List (From Ref. 43) 
 
 
Figure 20 displays a Kismet screenshot which shows STRATIS access points 
whose SSIDs were changed from the default to “ESSID” as well as the linksys AP with 
WEP disabled. 
 
                                                 
43Adam K. Kessel, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Symbol AP Access Control List 
Webpage Screen Shot, August 4 2005. 
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Figure 20.   Kismet screen capture linksys WEP disabled (From Ref. 44) 
 
Figure 21 shows the network details of a single STRATIS AP with its MAC 
address. 
                                                 
44Adam K. Kessel, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Kismet Screen Shot, August 4 2005. 
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Figure 21.   Kismet screen capture ESSID network details (From Ref. 45) 
 
A serious vulnerability that was observed within the STRATIS system was a 
stand-alone Linksys wireless AP within the confines of the warehouse which was 
connected to a Cox cable commercial ISP.  Although this was separated from the NIPR 
network, not only was the AP open with no WEP enabled, but they were transmitting 
information from the STRATIS system.  This basically subverts all security mechanisms 
that are enabled on the STRATIS network because they are transmitting unencrypted, 
official traffic over an unapproved wireless network. 
Figure 22 displays an Airopeek capture screenshot of the two Linksys Access 
Points. 
                                                 
45Adam K. Kessel, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Kismet Screen Shot, August 4 2005. 
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Figure 22.   Airopeek screen capture linksys WEP disabled (From Ref. 46) 
 
One final configuration issue that was observed was a connection to the NIPR 
network between warehouses which was used to connect the wireless networks together.  
This introduces the possibility of a wireless attacker gaining access to the NIPR network 
which otherwise could be prevented.  A solution to this issue would be to switch the 
operating mode of the APs at the end of the warehouses from root to repeater mode.  This 
essentially links the two APs together without adding a wired link between them.  This 
can easily be done if they are relatively close together or a directional antenna can be 
installed on each end to ensure the appropriate RF range output. 
The biggest problem that remains for these organizations is how to determine 
what wireless networks are authorized or unauthorized and if they are authorized, how to 
locate and disable them on a regular basis.  In the following two chapters a number of 
                                                 
46Adam K. Kessel, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Airopeek Screen Shot, August 4 
2005. 
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recommendations will be discussed to help these organizations with finding solutions and 
procedures that will address wireless vulnerabilities. 
 
D. ORGANIZATION THREE 
 
1. Background 
Organization Three was selected in order to assess the overall security of a well 
known unclassified secure wireless network.  This organization’s implementation will be 
discussed in detail in a complete chapter because of the significant security and well 
thought out layered defense structure of the wireless network.  Many agencies have been 
involved in the testing and assessment of this network to include the NSA, FIWC, Naval 
Postgraduate School, and Mitre Corporation.  This particular organization has a very 
small footprint with one building on the installation with wireless access and a remote 
facility with interconnected wireless roughly three miles away.  The geography presents 
many opportunities for remote access to the RF medium due to the proximity of homes, 
businesses, and a major highway within a few hundred yards of the installation.  All U.S. 
military services are represented at this installation and many foreign service 
representatives as well as a large population of civil service workers and contractors.  At 
the time of the assessment the only authorized wireless networks was the WLAN which 
was assessed.  Classified and Unclassified networks are resident on this installation with 
no wireless classified networks detected. 
 
2. Wireless Discovery 
The Kismet scanner found over 50 APs with many clients roaming between them.  
Although it was simple to scan the RF medium to view wireless traffic it was impossible 
to analyze any of the captured traffic due to the Layer 2 encryption employed through Air 
Fortress.  We were able to see through an Airopeek capture in Figure 23 that they were 
using Vocera communication devices over their wireless network.  The phone network 
runs on Cisco’s VOIP technology and the Vocera communicators have recently been 
implemented to extend the reach of the VOIP network to include mobile inter and intra- 
building communications.  Initially it was thought that it may be possible to hack into the 
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network through this vulnerability due to VOIP’s known vulnerabilities.  Vocera software 
supported the 64-bit wired equivalent privacy (WEP) and 128-bit WEP protocols, as well 
as virtual LANs (VLAN) which would be easy to crack and develop as an attack vector. 
Recently Vocera added support for Cisco's lightweight extensible authentication protocol 
(LEAP) and temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP).  In addition, the company has 
released support for Wi-Fi protected access (WPA) which will be implemented 
completely when the 802.11i protocol is ratified. 
 
Figure 23.   Airopeek screen capture Vocera devices on network (From Ref. 47) 
 
The following checklist represents a short list of wireless attributes observed 
during the wireless discovery phase. 
 
 
                                                 
47Adam K. Kessel, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Airopeek Screen Shot, August 4 
2005. 
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DSSS  FHSS  Bluetooth  Broadband  
 






















Number   __54__ 
 




MAC Filtering   Yes   No 
 
 Physical Access   Yes   No 
 
 Configuration Access   Wired   Wireless 
 
 Excessive Signal Strength   Yes   No   








 Type(s)   _Omni-directional__ 





Number   _500__  
 
Type(s)   1)  Desktops  4)  VOIP communicators 
 
    2)  Laptops 
 






Names of ESSIDs  1)  ESSID     
  
         




Type    _WEP_& Layer 2 AES (FIPS 140-2 validated)_ 
 
 
WEP   Yes   No   
 
Frequency of Key Changes _Monthly__ 
 
 
WPA   Yes  No  
 












This organization built their wireless network from the ground up with security at 
the forefront.  Although the scope of our wireless assessment was not meant to be a full 
spectrum assessment, it is clear that this WLAN is secure in the implementation of layer 
2 data encryption and device/user authentication.  We were able to detect the presence of 
802.11 networks, the AP SSIDs being used, which channels each access point was 
operating on, and clients probing for an access point to associate to.  In addition, we were 
able to ascertain from Airopeek data captures that they were using Vocera 
communicators within the WLAN.  It was impossible to capture any IP addresses because 
of the encryption.  The beginning stages of scanning, footprinting, and then enumeration 
generally require IP addresses to be visible in order to initiate any attack sequences.  Due 
to strong encryption techniques it was impossible to read any IP level data or capture 
device/user logins.   
 
a. Denial of Service 
Although IP addresses were not visible we were able to capture the MAC 
addresses of the APs, as shown in Figure 24, which allows us to initiate various attacks 
including Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. 
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Figure 24.   Airopeek screen capture AP MAC addresses visible (From Ref. 48) 
 
Another weakness in Vocera communicator’s configuration is the fact that 
it is possible to scan the entire IP subnet in which the VOIP network resides and a DoS 
results.  This would be a subset of an actual physical layer DoS attack where the entire 
RF medium is taken up by a high powered RF signal.  This means that although any 
specific DoS attack may accomplish the same objective, a physical layer DoS attack 
wipes out all traffic on the wireless medium. 
One major discovery that was found during the course of this assessment 
was AirDefense’s inability to detect and report on the active packet injection attack used 
in the process of cracking the WEP key.  In addition, AirDefense did not report any 
abnormalities within the WLAN while we initiated the inaugural “MSAK attack. 49”  
                                                 
48Adam K. Kessel, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Airopeek Screen Shot, August 4 
2005. 
49Adam K. Kessel, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, (Michael Shane Adam Kessel 
Attack), Term which defines the combination of a specific DoS attack and WEP cracking attack, 23 August 
2005. 
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The MSAK attack involves the use of Communication Machinery 
Corporation’s Emulation Engines which are used to emulate 128 wireless clients 
transmitting up to 1024 bytes of ICMP traffic every cycle on a targeted AP.  This results 
in an overload of data on an AP with the resultant 725 packets-per-second and up to 6 
Mbps per virtual station.  This means an individual AP can receive up to 1024Mbps total 
with 128 vSTAs.  This attack increases the total number of packets traversing the WLAN 
which dramatically decreases the amount of time needed to crack the WEP using Shmoo 
Group’s open source WEP cracking tool AirCrack.  The attack’s intricate details are 
omitted.   Figure 25 shows the result of the attack which reveals the secret WEP key. 
 
Figure 25.   WEP attack using Aircrack 64 bit key (From Ref. 50) 
 
Figure 26 displays an Airopeek capture of the 128 virtual stations which 
are represented by the MAC address of Senao Intl.  The two Linksys Group points 
                                                 
50Adam K. Kessel, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Aircrack Screen Shot, August 2, 
2005. 
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Figure 26.   Airopeek screen capture CMC Emulator DoS (From Ref. 51) 
                                                 




The Emulation Engine allows the user to create up to 64 configurable, 
concurrent, Virtual Stations (vSTA) that emulate 802.11 Wireless Local Area Network 
stations.  Each vSTA has a unique, user configurable, MAC and IP address allowing it to 
fully Authenticate, Associate, Deauthenticate and Disassociate as well as transmit and 
receive frames using IEEE 802.11 a/b/g.  Test data traffic can be generated per individual 
concurrent vSTA and actively injected through these 802.11 vSTAs into AP and WLAN 
systems under test in two different modes: 1. Internal - traffic is generated internally by 
each vSTA as configurable Ping traffic; 2. External - Data is sourced from various 
industry standard third party load generators over 802.3 Ethernet, mapped to each vSTA 
by IP address, and forwarded over 802.11a to the WLAN device under test by the 
emulator52.  
This organization’s implementation plan will be explored in more detail in 
Chapter VIII but it cannot be emphasized enough that availability always poses a serious 
security risk for even the most accomplished Wireless Administrators.  The research 
found within this chapter concludes that even the most secure WLAN that has significant 
penetration testing completed, can be vulnerable to multiple types of DoS attacks which 
completely shutdown access to the network as it did in this case.  It is recommended that 













                                                 
52Robert Hoskins, (2005),  CMC's New Wi-Fi Virtual Station Emulator  
Enables Load Testing of 802.11 Devices and WLAN Systems, Broadband Wireless Exchange Magazine,  
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VI. EVALUATION OF SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE 
SOLUTIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the software and hardware tools that 
should be considered for use in assessing, monitoring and securing WLANs within the 
Marine Corps.  We will consider open source shareware applications in addition to 
proprietary solutions.  Both Windows and LINUX based software applications will be 
reviewed.  These software tools will be evaluated on a wide assortment of criteria, 
ranging from cost and functionality to complexity and range of utility.  The final result 
desired is the identification of a standard set of tools which, if adopted enable efficient 
and effective management of WLAN assets.  This set of recommended tools will be 
presented in the form of an extremely capable toolkit which is designed to meet a diverse 
range of WLAN assessment requirements.   Each tool will be evaluated in terms of the 
four critical attributes functionality, utility, complexity, and cost. 
 
1. Functionality 
The tool must possess critical and/or unique capabilities.  These capabilities must 
be performed well and presented in manner that facilities effective WLAN assessment.  A 
robust functionality set will result in a tool receiving high scores under this criteria and 
more favorable overall assessment. 
 
2. Utility 
The tool must be able to perform a diverse range of tasks, therefore reducing the 
total number of tools needed for evaluating or monitoring WLANs.  Tools that interface 
well with other applications or provide multiple useful products within a single product 






The tool must present a user friendly interface that is relatively easy to use and is 
not inherently complicated.  This tool would be appropriate for new WLAN 
administrators who would be overwhelmed by the complexity or technical use of the tool.  
Products with well organized and intuitive presentation styles will receive high scores 
under this criteria. 
 
4. Cost 
The tool must be a good financial investment.  It should be provide significant 
“bang for the buck”.  While each of the criterions is subjective, this category is not as 
straight forward as it may appear.  Expensive tools can receive high scores as long as the 
tools represent strong value or good investments for the user.  Conversely, cheap tools 
with limited functionality, poor utility, or excessive complexity could receive low scores 
under this criteria. 
 
B. SOFTWARE/HARDWARE APPLICATIONS 
 
1. Open Source Freeware or Shareware Applications 
There are a plethora of tools that are available at no cost to the general public 
which were used at various stages of our research.  Open source tools are unique in that 
their source code is made available to potential users for individual and unique 
modifications.  Freeware applications are just as their name implies; made available to 
the public with only a recommendation to donate, but at no cost. These tools will be 
described in the below section. 
 
a. NetStumbler  
(1)  Description.  NetStumbler is a Windows based open source 
application for detecting WLANs.  It was first made available to the public in 2001 and 
can be downloaded from the internet at http://www.stumbler.net/. NetStumbler was 
intended to be a relatively quick and simple tool that could be used for WLAN auditing, 
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WLAN coverage verification, site surveys, war driving, and antenna positioning.  While 
its cost is very appealing, its capabilities are fairly limited to basic WLAN discovery.  
There is also a scaled down version of NetStumbler, known as MiniStumbler, which can 
downloaded to and used in PDA’s.  Figure 27 provides a screen shot of the user interface 




Figure 27.   NetStumbler (From Ref. 53) 
 
(2)  Strengths.  The primary strength of NetStumbler is the ability 
to conduct basic war driving with the use of the imbedded GPS feature.  In addition, 
NetStumbler’s relatively simple and user friendly interface is well suited for the detection 
of rogue access points.   
(3)  Weaknesses.  The primary weakness of NetStumbler is its 
limited capabilities. In addition, it is not able to conduct any significant traffic analysis 
                                                 
53 Shane Goodwin, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, NetStumbler Screen Shot, August 31, 
2005. 
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(4)  Summary.  The functionality of NetStumbler is relatively weak 
since it is limited to identifying rogue AP’s and WLANs and assessing signal strength.  
The overall utility of this software tool is closely related to its functionality.  NetStumbler 
was not determined to have high utility since it does not perform a diverse range of tasks.  
In terms of complexity, NetStumbler is ideal for new users due to simple presentation of 
information.  NetStumbler is freeware and so it receives high marks in the cost category. 
 
b. Kismet 
(1)  Description.  “Kismet is an 802.11 layer two wireless network 
detector, sniffer, and intrusion detection system.  Kismet will work with any wireless card 
which supports raw monitoring (rfmon) mode, and can sniff 802.11b, 802.11a, and 
802.11g traffic.  Kismet identifies networks by passively collecting packets and detecting 
standard named networks, detecting (and given time, decloaking) hidden networks, and 
inferring the presence of non-beaconing networks via data traffic”54.  Kismet is designed 
to work on a Linux based operating system although many free bootable CDs exist which 
allow a Windows system to boot into Linux with Kismet installed.  These bootable CDs 
will be described in detail in the following sections.  Kismet can be downloaded at the 
following website:  http://www.kismetwireless.net/code/kismet-2005-08-R1.tar.gz. 
Kismet has many features that are useful in different situations for 
monitoring wireless networks: 
 
• Ethereal/Tcpdump compatible data logging 
 
• Airsnort compatible weak-iv packet logging 
 
• Network IP range detection 
 
• Built-in channel hopping and multicard split channel hopping 
 
• Hidden network SSID decloaking 
 
• Graphical mapping of networks 
 
• Client/Server architecture allows multiple clients to view a single 
                                                 
54Kismet, Documentation, http://www.kismetwireless.net/documentation.shtml, Retrieved September 
1, 2005. 
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Kismet server simultaneously 
 
• Manufacturer and model identification of access points and clients 
 
• Detection of known default access point configurations 
 
• Runtime decoding of WEP packets for known networks 
 
• Named pipe output for integration with other tools, such as a layer3 IDS 
like Snort 
 
• Multiplexing of multiple simultaneous capture sources  
 
• Distributed remote drone sniffing 
 
• XML output 
 
• Over 20 supported card types 
 
 Common applications Kismet is useful for: 
 
• Wardriving:  Mobile detection of wireless networks, logging and mapping 
of network location, WEP, etc. 
 
• Site survey:  Monitoring and graphing signal strength and location. 
 
• Distributed IDS:  Multiple Remote Drone sniffers distributed throughout 
an installation monitored by a single server, possibly combined with a 
layer3 IDS like Snort. 
 
• Rogue AP Detection:  Stationary or mobile sniffers to enforce site policy 
against rogue access points. 
 
  Figure 28 shows a screenshot of the main page when you open 
Kismet.  The screenshot displays three different types of wireless networks.  
 
• Two Encrypted Networks (SSID: 2WIRE521, 2WIRE514) using WEP  
• One Hidden Encrypted Network (SSID: Zemfira) using WPA  




Figure 28.   Kismet main screenshot (From Ref. 55) 
 
(2)  Strengths.  One of the primary advantages of Kismet is its 
ability to decloak hidden network SSIDs.  In addition, it has a user-friendly, color-coded 
description of each SSID which helps to identify which APs are encrypted or 
unencrypted without drilling down into the actual network details.  It also provides very 
useful details at the bottom of the screen which displays relevant status messages. 
(3)  Weaknesses.  One major weakness is the fact that the majority 
of windows users do not have the ability to run Kismet on their computers.  Also, the 
Graphical User Interface (GUI) is a bit clumsy and does not have point and click 
functionality.  This requires the user to know the keys that represent commands in 
advance or at least know which key to press in order to find the help menu. 
(4)  Summary.  Kismet is one of the most diverse and cost-
effective WLAN analysis tools available.  Its functionality as a scanner, sniffer, and IDS 
alone make it more diverse than most products.  In terms of utility, Kismet is a very good 
choice to start with and with enough creativity and knowledge, it can be used as a 
                                                 
55 Remote Exploit, Research Kismet Primer Guide, http://new.remote-exploit.org/index.php/Research, 
Retrieved September 1, 2005. 
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complete distributed IDS system including servers as well as mobile Kismet laptops or 
PDAs used for locating unauthorized clients or rogue access points.  Finally, Kismet is 
unmatched in terms of price compared to functionality. 
 
c. Ethereal  
(1)  Description.  Ethereal is an open source network packet 
analyzer which can be used on either UNIX or Windows platforms.  Ethereal was first 
released in 1998 and can be downloaded from the internet at http://www.ethereal.com/. It 
can be used to capture packet data from wired or wireless network interfaces.  It enables 
users to import data from other packet capture tools or export Ethereal data to other 
programs.  Ethereal also has some powerful search and filter options which enable 




Figure 29.   Ethereal (From Ref. 56) 
                                                 
56 Shane Goodwin, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Ethereal User Interface Screen Shot, 
September 1, 2005. 
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 (2)  Strengths.  The primary strengths of Ethereal lie in its packet 
capture and filter capability and platform independence.   
(3)  Weaknesses.  Ethereal has a rudimentary user interface which 
facilitates presentation of data via numerous searches and filters but provides no helpful 
analysis. 
(4)  Summary.  The functionality of Ethereal is very solid with 
exceptional packet capture and filter capabilities.  Ethereal also receives high marks in 
terms of utility due to its platform independence and its ability to be used on wired or 
wireless interface.  Ethereal is not ideal for individuals new to network administration or 
traffic analysis and therefore received a poor complexity grade.   As with the case of 
other freeware solutions, Ethereal’s cost makes it an ideal candidate for government 
work. 
 
e. Bootable CDs – (Auditor, Knoppix STD, PHLAK) 
Bootable CDs are very useful because of the ability to load on any 
computer with a CD ROM.  This means that if someone needed to use a network analysis 
tool that was only available on Linux and they are running the Windows operating 
system, it would be possible to load a version of Linux with the tool preinstalled.  If the 
computer did not have a CD ROM there are currently software solutions that allow a user 
to convert a CD ISO image to a USB Flash bootable drive.  An ISO image file is an 
image of a CD-ROM disk saved in ISO 9660 format.  ISO image files are widely used to 
store CD content and transfer it through the Internet.  ISO is a common CD image format 
for DOS, Windows (Joliet ISO extension), Linux (RockRidge ISO extension) and other 
operating systems.  ISO images are generally duplicates of CDs rather than floppies or 
hard drives. Most popular CD recording programs can burn ISO images onto recordable 
CDs57.  
(1)  Description.  Auditor- The Auditor security collection is a Live-
System based on KNOPPIX.  With no installation whatsoever, the analysis platform is 
                                                 
57Undisker, Open, Create and Extract ISO files, http://www.undisker.com/creating-iso-images.html, 
Retrieved September 2, 2005. 
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started directly from the CD-Rom and is fully accessible within minutes.  Independent of 
the hardware in use, the Auditor security collection offers a standardized working 
environment, so that the build-up of know-how and remote support is made easier.  Even 
during the planning and development stages, our target was to achieve an excellent user-
friendliness combined with an optimal toolset. Professional open-source programs offer 
you a complete toolset to analyze your safety, byte for byte. In order to become quickly 
proficient within the Auditor security collection, the menu structure is supported by 
recognized phases of a security check. (Foot-printing, analysis, scanning, wireless, brute-
forcing, cracking).  By this means, you instinctively find the right tool for the appropriate 
task.  In addition to the approx. 300 tools, the Auditor security collection contains further 
background information regarding the standard configuration and passwords, as well as 
word lists from many different areas and languages with approx. 64 million entries.  
Current productivity tools such as web browser, editors and graphic tools allow you to 
create or edit texts and pictures for reports, directly within the Auditor security platform. 
Many tools were adapted, newly developed or converted from other system platforms, in 
order to make as many current auditing tools available as possible on one CD-ROM.  
Tools like Wellenreiter and Kismet are equipped with automatic hardware identification, 
thus avoiding irritating and annoying configuration of the wireless cards.  Listed below 




Nmap (Network scanner)  
NmapFE (Graphical network scanner)  
 
Scanning 
Cisco global exploiter (Cisco scanner)  
Nessus (Security Scanner)  
Netmask (Requests netmask)  
Nmap (Network scanner)  
 
Scanning 
Cisco global exploiter (Cisco scanner)  
Analyzer 
AIM-SNIFF (AIM sniffer)  
                                                 
58Remote Exploit, Auditor, http://new.remote-exploit.org/index.php/Auditor_main, Retrieved 
September 2, 2005. 
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Nessus (Security Scanner)  
Netmask (Requests netmask)  
Nmap (Network scanner)  
NmapFE (Graphical network scanner)  
Unicornscan (Fast port scanner)  
Protos (Protocol identification)  
 
Mailsnarf (Mail sniffer)  
URLsnarf (URL sniffer)  
Etherape (Network monitor)  
Ethereal (Network analyzer)  
Ettercap (Sniffer/Interceptor/Logger)  
Dsniff (Password sniffer)  
 
Spoofing 
Arpspoof (ARP spoofer)  
Macof (ARP spoofer/generator)  
Nemesis-Ethernet (Packet generator)  
DNSSpoof (DNS spoofer)  
Nemesis-DNS (DNS packet generator)  
DHCPX (DHCP flooder)  
Hping2 (Packet generator)  
ICMPRedirect (ICMP  packet generator) 
Nemesis-IP (IP packet generator) 
Wireless 
apmode.sh (Act as accesspoint)  
Hotspotter (Client penetration)  
ASLeap (LEAP/PPTP cracker)  
Void11-Hopper (Channel hopper)  
Kismet (Ncurses wireless scanner)  
Wellenreiter (GUI scanner) 
aircrack (Modern WEP cracker)  
Aireplay (Wireless packet injector)  
Airsnort (GUI based WEP cracker)  
Cowpatty (WPA PSK bruteforcer)  
 
Bluetooth 
Bluesnarfer (Bluesnarf attack)  
Ghettotooth (Bluetooth scanner)  
Kandy (Mobile phone tool)  
 
Bruteforce 
Guess-who (SSH bruteforc)  




Figure 30 shows a screenshot of the Auditor Security Collection 




Figure 30.   Auditor (From Ref. 59) 
(2)  Description.  Knoppix STD- The Knoppix Security Tools Distribution 
is STD is a Linux-based Security Tool.  Actually, it is a collection of hundreds if not 
thousands of open source security tools.  It's a Live Linux Distro, which means it runs 
from a bootable CD in memory without changing the native operating system of the host 
computer.  Its sole purpose in life is to put a great deal of security tools at your disposal 
with a savvy user interface.  STD is meant to be used by both novice and professional 
security personnel but is not ideal for the Linux uninitiated.  STD assumes you know the 
                                                 
59 Adam K. Kessel, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Auditor Security Collection, AirSnort 
screenshot, September 2, 2005. 
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basics of Linux as most of your work will be done from the command line.  KNOPPIX is 
a bootable Live system on CD or DVD, consisting of a representative collection of 
GNU/Linux software, automatic hardware detection, and support for many graphics cards, 
sound cards, SCSI and USB devices and other peripherals.  KNOPPIX can be used as a 
productive Linux system for the desktop, educational CD, rescue system, or adapted and 
used as a platform for commercial software product demos60. 
Figure 31 shows a screenshot of KNOPPIX STD running a proprietary 
encryption algorithm called Megaencryption. 
 
 
Figure 31.   Knoppix (From Ref. 61) 
 
(3)  Description.  PHLAK-  PHLAK is a modular live security Linux 
distribution. PHLAK comes with two light gui's (fluxbox and XFCE4), many security 
tools, and a spiral notebook full of security documentation. PHLAK is a derivative of 
                                                 
60Knoppix, Knopper.net, http://www.knoppix.org, Retrieved September 3, 2005. 
61 Softpedia, Knoppix STD 0.1, Encryption screenshot, Retrieved September 3, 2005. 
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Morphix, created by Alex de Landgraaf62.  Figure 32 displays the categories available for 
use with the PHLAK software suite. 
 
 
Figure 32.   PHLAK (From Ref. 63) 
 
 
(4)  Strengths.  Auditor is by far the most useful and functional toolkit 
when it comes to network security combined with user-friendliness.  It merges over 300 
security tools with common utilities such as text and graphic editors which makes it the 
most complete and optimum choice of bootable network security CDs in this lineup.  
Auditor is based on the Knoppix bootable Live distribution so it has similar strengths 
such as very good hardware detection and a very organized assortment of menu options.  
Knoppix STD is very secure when booted and provides a secure workspace to use 
                                                 
62PHLAK, Professional Hacker’s Linux Assault Kit, http://www.phlak.org/modules/news/, Retrieved 
September 3, 2005. 
63 PHLAK, Professional Hacker’s Linux Assault Kit, http://www.phlak.org/modules/sections/, 
Retrieved September 3, 2005. 
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without the need for additional tools.  PHLAK currently includes two fast, light-weight 
window managers, from which the user has easy access to the documentation system.  
Currently included in the user interface are quick-start buttons to initiate services which 
helps Linux beginners who may not know many shell commands. 
(5)  Weaknesses.  Auditor has a somewhat lengthy boot time and does not 
provide much in the way of documentation for the tools found on the CD. Knoppix STD 
does not provide many GUIs for its tools and most are command line tools.  PHLAK’s 
menu structure is very cumbersome and the tools are not organized in a logical manner.  
In addition, PHLAK has poor hardware support and detection. 
(6)  Summary.  Auditor is recommended by the Authors due to its 
comprehensive network security solutions as well as its useful added utilities which make 
it closer to a normal operating system than any of the other bootable CDs reviewed.  
Although Knoppix STD comes in as a close second to Auditor, it does not provide many 
of the extra utilities that are useful in a normal operating system such as a screen capture 
tool.  The builders of these security suites are often in competition with one another 




2. Proprietary Commercial Software Applications 
The number of proprietary or commercial tools which can assist in WLAN 
assessment and security is virtually endless.  Throughout the conduct of our research we 
explored various commercial products for the purposes of evaluating their usefulness to 
Marine Corps WLAN assessment.  We have selected five of the most common and useful 
tools for discussion below: 
 
a. AirMagnet 
(1)  Description.  AirMagnet is a Windows based software tool 
which can be used on a laptop or PDA to provide mobile WLAN analysis and 
management.  It is intended to provide wireless intrusion detection, rogue access point 
detection, connection troubleshooting, trending, reporting, capacity planning, signal and 
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channel analysis and site survey preparation.   Additional information regarding this 
WLAN tool can be found on http://www.airmagnet.com/.  Figure 33 shows AirMagnet’s 




Figure 33.   AirMagnet (From Ref. 64) 
 
 (2)  Strengths.  The strengths of AirMagnet are found in its diverse 
assortment of user interfaces which display a great deal of practical WLAN information.  
These dynamic graphical displays reveal WLAN data along with useful analysis on the 
same screen.   It is ideal for new administrators who need to understand the “big picture” 
before they can delve into the WLAN details.  It is also very useful for briefing or 
                                                 
64 Shane Goodwin, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, AirMagnet Screen Shot, May 19, 
2004. 
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communicating WLAN considerations and issues to non-technical individuals within 
your organization.   
(3)  Weaknesses.  AirMagnet is not open source and so the source 
code is not able to be altered to meet individual organizational requirements.  AirMagnet 
is not ideal for advanced WLAN vulnerability assessment.  The cost of AirMagnet may 
be cost prohibitive for smaller organizations with minimal IT resources devoted to 
wireless networking. 
(4)  Summary.  AirMagnet has a solid functionality set which 
leverages multiple useful and practical data views.  It receives average grades in utility 
since its strength lies only in presentation of big picture oversight and assessment.   In 
terms of complexity, AirMagnet’s dependence on the graphical display of information 
results in excellent complexity scores, since even the most novice WLAN administrators 
will appreciate its simple user friendly presentation style.  AirMagnet cost is only 
palatable for medium to large sized IT budgets. 
 
b. AirDefense  
(1)  Description.  AirDefense is yet another commercial Windows 
based program for WLAN assessment and monitoring and was designed to be a wireless 
intrusion detection system.  It is available in Enterprise and Mobile versions to cater to 
various size organizations.  The Enterprise version is server-based while AirDefense 
Mobile is Windows-based.  AirDefense was designed to perform wireless network scans, 
device inventory, location tracking, and advanced rogue management.  It will discover 
and identify all 802.11 devices and their transmissions within a given air space.   
Additional information regarding AirDefense can be found on the following website: 
http://www.airdefense.net/.    Figure 34 is a screenshot from one of the many dashboard 




Figure 34.   AirDefense (From Ref. 65) 
 
 (2)  Strengths.  Graphically designed interface is user friendly and 
well organized.  Its strength lies in its ability to quickly scan the airspace for wireless 
activity to easily identify rogue access points. 
(3)  Weaknesses.  Minimal traffic analysis capability compared to 
other software suites of its size and cost.  AirDefense is not very flexible in terms of 
configuration to meet or research unique requirements. 
(4)  Summary.  Functionality of AirDefense is adequate for basic 
WLAN administration.  In terms of utility, AirDefense does not provide a diverse 
assortment of applications for advanced WLAN assessment. It does provide useful 
information which can be explored in further using other more in-depth tools.  Lack of 
complexity is a significant advantage for AirDefense whose easy to use interface is well 
suited for basic WLAN administration.  AirDefense is an expensive commercial off the 
shelve program which is certainly capable but not essential to WLAN assessment. 
                                                 




c. AiroPeek Nx 
 (1)  Description.  Airopeek Nx is a Windows based expert WLAN 
analyzer.  This software tool is designed to conduct site surveys, security audits, WLAN 
traffic analysis, and troubleshooting.  In addition to fundamental packet analysis 
AiroPeek Nx provides advanced interpretations and diagnostics for WLAN traffic 
patterns.  AiroPeek quickly isolates security problems, fully decodes all 802.11 WLAN 
protocols, and analyzes wireless network performance with accurate identification of 
signal strength, channel and other network statistics.  Additional information about 
AiroPeek and other WildPackets products can be found at the following website: 
http://www.wildpackets.com/products/airopeek/airopeek_nx/overview/. As shown in 
Figure 35 below, WLAN information is presented in very methodical manner with the 
ability to drill down on specific items showing more and more descriptions and analysis. 
 
Figure 35.   AiroPeek (From Ref. 66) 
 
                                                 
66 Shane Goodwin, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, AiroPeek Screen Shot, May 19, 2004. 
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 (2)  Strengths.  AiroPeek Nx has numerous strengths which make 
it an ideal candidate for advanced WLAN assessment.  AiroPeek provides intuitive user 
interface with critical information for WLAN problem resolution on each screen.  It 
possesses many useful tools like a network peer map which enable users to quickly 
understand nodes operating in the WLAN and their traffic patterns.   
(3)  Weaknesses.  The only weakness we could identify in 
Airopeek Nx was that it is designed for advanced or expert users.  However, Wildpackets 
does offer AiroPeek SE , which is a slightly scaled down and more basic version. 
(4)  Summary.  The functionality found within Airopeek is 
extremely strong and useful.  It quickly became our tool of choice for conducting WLAN 
assessments because of it ability to facilitate advanced WLAN analysis.  In terms of 
utility, AiroPeek received high marks for its peer node map and WLAN problem finder.  
Both of these capabilities could not be matched in comparable products we evaluated.  
Airopeek’s user interface is not excessively complex but clearly is not designed for 
beginners.  The cost of AiroPeek was comparable to other Windows based WLAN 
analyzers, but with more robust functionality it is worth the investment. 
 
d. Cognio ISMS 
(1)  Description.  The Cognio Intelligent Spectrum Management 
System (ISMS) solution provides RF spectrum analysis for troubleshooting and 
optimizing WLANs as well as The Mobile’s Device Finder feature which is similar to an 
RF device “Geiger Counter” which makes it easy to locate troublesome or unauthorized 
devices, including rogue access points.  Using patented spectral analysis and 
fingerprinting techniques, the Cognio ISMS Mobile measures, analyzes, and displays 
critical spectrum data and logs interference events in real-time67.  In addition, the Cognio 
ISMS provides real-time device detection and device identification by analyzing all RF 
activity and instantly detecting and identifying RF emitting devices using WiFi bands.  
Cognio’s ISMS is one of the only solutions on the market that actually identifies the 
interfering device, greatly simplifying troubleshooting.  Figure 36 shows two interfering 
                                                 
67Cognio, ISMS Mobile Datasheet, http://www.cognio.com/solutions_mobile.html, Retrieved 
September 1, 2005. 
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devices as well as a settings screen that allows the user to pick specific frequency bands 
to monitor. 
 
Figure 36.   Cognio  (From Ref. 68) 
Figure 37 shows what kind of device was interfering with the 802.11 
network in the 2.4 GHz frequency band which helps to locate the device itself. 
                                                 
68 Adam K. Kessel, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Cognio ISMS Device Finder 
screenshot, September 2, 2005. 
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Figure 37.   Cognio (From Ref. 69) 
 
(2)  Strengths.  The Cognio ISMS is unlike other systems, which 
monitor only 802.11 packet flow, the Cognio ISMS monitors all activity in the RF 
spectrum, fully replacing a spectrum analyzer.  Compared to other similar solutions the 
Cognio solution is extremely affordable at approximately $3,600.  An average spectrum 
analyzer can cost up to $35,000 and does not even provide the other features found in this 
device. 
(3)  Weaknesses.  One weakness that affects many proprietary 
solutions is the fact that it is very difficult to modify the software in order to suit the 
needs of the user.  Another minor weakness that can be said of any new solution is that it 
is relatively unproven on the market. 
(4)  Summary.  Overall, the Cognio ISMS provides excellent 
functionality with spectral analysis as well as the unparalleled diversity included in one 
                                                 
69 Adam K. Kessel, Captain USMC, Naval Postgraduate School, Cognio ISMS Device Finder, 
September 2, 2005. 
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package.  In addition, the ability to use the card in any device with a PCMCIA slot 
provides a very unique utility that allows any user to employ this solution without the 
need for special equipment. 
 
e. YellowJacket 
(1)  Description.  Yellowjacket is one of many wireless assessment 
tools created by Berkeley Varitronics Systems.  Yellowjacket is a handheld 802.11b 
wireless receiver which can be used to sweep and analyze WLANs.  It is able to identify 
SSIDs, locate access points, measure signal strength and signal-to-noise ratio, and report 
channel usage. Additional information about Yellowjacket can be found at the following 
website: http://www.bvsystems.com/Products/WLAN/Yellowjacket/yellowjacket.htm/.  
Figure 38 shows the Yellowjacket suite which is composed of the BVS receiver and PDA 
with Yellowjacket software. 
 
Figure 38.   Yellowjacket (From Ref. 70) 
 
 (2)  Strengths.  The strengths of the Yellowjacket suite clearly lie 
in its portable handheld design coupled with its ability to physically locate rogue APs.   
                                                 
70 Berkeley Varitronics Systems, Yellowjacket, 
http://www.bvsystems.com/Products/WLAN/YJ802.11bg/YJ802.11bg.htm, Retrieved July 29, 2005. 
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(3)  Weaknesses.  The Yellowjacket software and hardware 
components are both extremely difficult to keep operational.  The suite requires constant 
operational checks and is difficult to rely upon for consistent WLAN assessment.  Also, 
Yellowjacket cannot be considered a complete WLAN analysis tool because it does not 
provide any Bluetooth analysis capability although another BVS tool names Mantis, does 
provide this capability. 
(4)  Summary.  In terms of functionality, Yellowjacket is able to 
provide basic WLAN assessment information (SSID, MAC address, WEP, signal 
strength, channel usage, etc) in uniquely portable design.  However, Yellowjacket is not 
able to perform a diverse range of WLAN tasks, in fact, just the opposite is true.  
Yellowjacket is not excessively complex, however keeping the ultra portable system up 
and running requires a technical genius.  The cost of Yellowjacket Suite is significant 
considering its operational inconsistency.  
 
C. EVALUATION CHART  
Table 1 was used to evaluate the various software and hardware tools that were 
used to conduct our WLAN security and assessment research.  As discussed previously, 
we used the acronym FUCC to represent the critical aspects of each tool that we wanted 
to evaluate; Functionality, Utility, Complexity, and Cost.  Each of these criteria was rated  
below in Table 1 from one to ten for each WLAN tool with the resultant overall grade 
shown in the far right hand column.  Higher scores are indicative of a more favorable 
evaluation.  Poor performance in any criteria would be reflected with scores ranging from 
one to two.  Below average performance would be indicated by scores ranging from three 
to four. An average performance in any criteria received a grade of five.  Above average 
performance would be reflected with a scores ranging from six to seven, while excellent 
performance would be indicated with scores ranging from eight to ten.  For example, a 
tool that had great functionality and range of utility coupled with a low level of 
complexity and excellent “bang for the buck” would receive grades of eight to ten in 
every criterion.  High complexity from rudimentary user interfaces and overly technical 
presentation information were penalized with low scores.  Finally high cost was not 
penalized if it made up for the cost by providing outstanding functionality with added 















NetStumbler 4 4 10 7 25 
Kismet 7 7 8 9 31 
Ethereal 7 6 5 8 26 
Bootable CD’s      
PHLAK 5 4 4 7 20 
Knoppix 7 7 8 8 30 
Auditor 8 8 9 9 34 
AirMagnet 7 6 9 6 28 
AirDefense 7 6 9 6 28 
AiroPeek 9 9 6 9 33 
Cognio 8 8 9 6 31 
YellowJacket 7 8 4 6 25 
Poor               Below Average              Average              Above Average                 Excellent 
1             2               3               4                  5                6              7              8            9            10 
 
Table 1. Evaluation of Software / Hardware Applications 
 
D. SUMMARY 
During the course of this chapter we have discussed various tools which can be 
used to assess and monitor WLANs.  Let’s conclude our discussion by framing these 
tools in terms of the needs of a particular organization.  Each organization with WLAN 
assets needs to have tools which provide basic packet sniffing and WLAN analysis, 
intrusion detection, and finally some sort of vulnerability self-assessment capability. 
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Each organization with wireless network will need to conduct wireless packet 
sniffing and basic WLAN analysis.  We have introduced numerous tools which could be 
used to accomplish these tasks.  Smaller organizations might consider using 
MiniStumbler or NetStumbler as a basic mobile WLAN packet sniffer.  Although, 
Ethereal and Kismet are more desirable options from the standpoint of additional 
functionality.  However, that additional functionality requires a slightly higher degree of 
technical WLAN experience and competence.  Each of these software tools is free to the 
public which makes them ideal candidates for smaller organization with limited IT 
resources.  Medium sized organizations with a few extra IT resources might consider 
using Yellowjacket as a mobile WLAN analyzer to locate rogue APs and conduct 
intermediate wireless traffic analysis.  However, what medium sized organization really 
require is a tool like AirMagnet which provides some advanced WLAN assessment along 
with rogue AP identification and traffic analysis.  Large organizations with mature 
WLAN implementations and advanced WLAN administrators need to use a product like 
Cognio or AiroPeek Nx.  These tools are comparable and would properly equip network 
administrators with the requisite troubleshooting, monitoring and expert analysis 
applications for keeping their organization’s WLAN functional and secure.   
One important tool for any wireless implementation is some form of Wireless 
Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) functionality.  Most businesses and military 
organizations agree that a WIDS is necessary regardless of whether WLANs exist on the 
organization’s network in order to detect unauthorized wireless access and rogue access 
points.  Two of the tools evaluated in this chapter worth mentioning that have WIDS 
functionality are Kismet and Air Defense.  While Kismet can detect many of the top 
attack methods used on a wireless network, and a few not so common, Kismet goes one 
step further and can actually be used as a distributed WIDS system. By setting up a 
kismet drone, and pointing it to a central server, you can easily setup an enterprise wide 
WIDS that rivals solutions with a much higher price tag.  AirDefense has a much higher 
price tag and requires the purchase of other hardware and software.  Of course 
AirDefense offers more functionality and support from the company.  Kismet would be 
recommended for a small to medium size organization while AirDefense would be 
recommended for larger organization looking for a more robust and supportable solution. 
96 
Assessing the wired and wireless vulnerabilities of a local area network internally 
is essential in determining network security and health.  The vulnerability assessment tool 
of choice recommended by these Authors is the Auditor Security Collection bootable CD.  
This tool can be downloaded for free and used by any size organization in order to assess 
network vulnerabilities.  This capability is necessary for organizations to replicate 
potential attackers and practice Information Assurance professional’s response to them.  
Just as a military unit replicates its enemies in order to structure an appropriate response 
and must train to fight effectively, a network administrator or CTO must ensure they are 





















VII. STANDARD PROCEDURES FOR DETECTING, ASSESSING 
AND SECURING WLANS  
 
A. INTRODUCTION  
One of the practical outputs that we wanted to achieve within the context of our 
thesis was the identification of a standard set of tools and procedures to conduct 
vulnerability assessments within the Marine Corps.  This chapter builds on the previous 
introduction and evaluation of software solutions by coupling these tools together with 
the requisite step by step procedures to assess WLANs.   We have selected several of the 
previously identified tools which we believe provides the most functionality, greatest 
utility, least amount of complexity, and represents the best value for conducting 
vulnerability assessment within the Marine Corps. 
 
B. COORDINATING A WIRELESS VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
The first step in conducting a vulnerability assessment is to first determine what 
kind of advance coordination is required.  For the vast majority of the scenarios, that 
question is answered by whether the assessment is aimed at evaluating internal or 
external assets.   
 
1. Internal Assessment 
An internal assessment represents a proactive attempt to conduct a self-
evaluation.  Internal assessments are valuable tools for many reasons.  First and most 
importantly, they are a means to identify potential problem areas early, before they create 
actual vulnerabilities or before the vulnerabilities can be exploited by another party.  
Second, an audit of potential weaknesses or vulnerabilities is required to be conducted on 
an annual basis by Marine Corps Order 5200.24CW.  The Internal Management Control 
Program (IMCP) states that “Commanders/managers are responsible for ensuring that 
resources under their purview are used efficiently and effectively, and that programs and 
operations are discharged with integrity and in compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations.”  The IMCP program applies to all resources or programs not just those 
related to information or communication security.  Finally, an internal assessment is 
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important because it reduces the likelihood that an external audit or evaluation will find 
significant vulnerabilities which could lead to negative attention to your command. 
 
2. External Assessment 
Assessment of external WLAN assets will generally come in two different 
scenarios.  The first type of external assessment is the traditional audit which is 
conducted by a completely external agency.  Evaluations conducted by the DOD 
Inspector General or Naval Audit Service would fall under this category.  The second 
scenario for external assessments is when you are evaluating a subordinate unit which has 
its own command structure and operates independent of your organization.  An 
assessment of Division assets by MEF personnel or evaluation of an installation by the 
appropriate Marine Forces Commander would both fall under this category.  These 
assessments obviously require additional attention due to inherent sensitivities that are 
encountered when evaluating external programs and resources. 
 
C. CONDUCTING A WIRELESS VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
 This focus of this thesis is primarily on WLAN security issues and addressing 
methods to mitigate vulnerabilities and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to expound on 
every detail of network security.  There are vast technical considerations involved in 
conducting a complete network security assessment.  Outside of what is explained below 
regarding wireless vulnerability assessments, a complete network security assessment 
would involve initiating threat assessments, risk assessments, penetration assessments, 
application assessments and system security audits to name a few. 
 Vulnerability assessments focus on identifying weaknesses in a system that has 
the potential to be exploited by a threat.  One important point to note is that not all 
vulnerabilities are “technical” in nature.  For example, the lack of a solid security policy 
is a high-risk vulnerability that may or may not be obvious from the perspective of a 
technical vulnerability assessment.  In this same manner, the fact that WPA is being used 
to encrypt wireless traffic does not completely address the overall security of the wireless 
network if the Pre-Shared Key is published on the organization’s website. 
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1. Formal Notification of Command 
Formal notification of command is typically accomplished with a standard naval 
message from the Commanding Officer of the reviewing agency to the Commanding 
Officer of the organization to be evaluated.  This message should possess all the formal 
requirements of the assessment to include the date, agenda, specific access requirements, 
and points of contact, in addition to any assistance or participation you will need from the 
organization.  As with any other type of assessment, coordination for a WLAN 
assessment should begin well in advance of formal notification.  This advance 
coordination is critical to communicate expectations and requirements from both sides of 
the assessment.  Formal notification should be made a minimum of thirty to forty-five 
days in advance of the assessment.   
 
2. In-brief 
Assessing an external agency’s WLAN almost always requires an in-brief with 
the organization to be evaluated.  This in-brief can range from a formal presentation to 
just an introduction followed by informal discussion about the conduct of the WLAN 
assessment.  The requirements of the assessment not to mention the personalities of the 
organizations involved will drive the formality or informality of the in-brief.  Based on 
experience, the best question to ask the command you are visiting prior to the assessment 
is, do you have any wireless?  Depending on the response, you know how extensive your 
search will have to be.  When the answer to the question is a flat out no, the situation is 
one of two possibilities.  Either the IT and/or IA staff is really on top of the wireless 
security state of affairs or they assume there is none because it has not yet been 
authorized.  When the answer is yes, generally the installation has a decent grasp on what 
they are up against and are in need of a few pointers and/or some tools to assist them in 







Before the actual conduct of the assessment takes place, an assessment team 
should have in their position an official message or letter from the specific command 
stating at a minimum where the assessment should be taking place, the names of the 
individuals on the assessment team and what authority is given to the them, what level of 
disclosure is permitted, and who to contact when assessment team presence and authority 
must be verified. 
 
 a. Wardriving 
The SANS Institute (SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security) defines 
Wardriving as the process of traveling around looking for wireless access point signals 
that can be used to get network access.  Wardriving was named after Wardialing because 
it also involves searching for accessible computer systems.  Wardriving can be used as a 
tool for Computer Network Defense (CND) or it can be categorized as a threat against a 
WLAN.  This research will describe the former and how Wardriving should be a part of a 
sound network security approach regardless of the presence of any official or authorized 
WLANs. 
(1) Hardware/Software Selection.  The essential requirements for 
Wardriving include a laptop or PDA, a wireless card, and some type of scanning 
software.  Of course to cover a wider area and to track noteworthy locations an external 
antenna, amplifier and a GPS device would be needed. 
When choosing what type of laptop or PDA to use while 
Wardriving, one must keep in mind power requirements for different devices as well as 
what software will run on the various devices.  Generally, most available programs will 
run on a Linux laptop while a Windows-based laptop will run some programs or will 
provide the ability to run CD bootable programs that are mostly Linux-based.  MAC 
operating systems have a few options for Wardriving but are extremely limited.  Finally, 
a PDA may provide more mobility, concealment, and battery life when compared to a 
laptop although the software that will run on most PDA’s is very limited. 
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The next necessary component is the wireless card.  The two most 
significant factors when choosing a wireless card are which chipset the card runs on and 
whether or not the card has an external antenna connector.  Chipset must be known 
because of the various software requirements and which chipsets the software will 
support.  Three of the most frequently used chipsets are Hermes, Prism, and Aironet.  
Without the ability to connect an external antenna, a Wardriver is very limited in the 
distance that he/she can cover without being within 50-100 feet of every point in which 
the Wardriving is taking place.  Most Hermes based chipsets provide external antenna 
connectors on their wireless cards. 
As mentioned previously, an external antenna is not required but 
anything used to extend the range of a wireless card allows a Wardriver to detect more 
wireless access points with less distance covered.  When choosing an external antenna, 
one must ensure it operates on the same frequency as the potential wireless networks.  If 
the antenna works in the 2.4Ghz (802.11b/g) or 5.8Ghz (802.11a) spectrum it will be able 
to acquire the signal of most WLANs with the majority being in the 2.4Ghz spectrum.  In 
addition, a Wardriver must decide whether to use an omni-directional or directional 
antenna.  Omni-directional antennas are mostly used because of their ability to cover a 
wide area as opposed to the directional antennas which direct the wireless reception into 
one specific direction. 
The use of an amplifier may be required to sniff remote areas from 
a stand-off distance.  Most antennas will provide the extra power levels needed to cover 
significant distances beyond what a wireless card alone could cover.  Having said that, 
many wardrivers still choose to use amplifiers to cover even further distances without 
regard for the FCC power limit of 1 Watt. 
It is useful to simply produce data on wireless access points 
operating in a given area but especially for larger areas, it becomes necessary to map out 
where the signals are picked up in regard to established maps.  GPS devices with either 
serial or USB connections work with the majority of scanning programs as long as they 
are capable of NMEA output.  Very inexpensive GPS units are available for strictly 
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Wardriving purposes with no added functionality other than providing coordinates from 
GPS satellites. 
There are many options for scanning software ranging from very 
expensive to free but only a few of these programs will be described based on ease of use 
and functionality.  Both Netstumbler (Windows-based) and Kismet (Linux-based) were 
evaluated in the previous chapter but due to the simplicity and limited functionality of 
Netstumbler, Kismet will be described in detail as a wireless scanner of choice. 
(2)  Kismet Scanning.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Kismet is an 802.11 layer2 wireless network detector, sniffer, and intrusion detection 
system.  Kismet will work with any wireless card which supports raw monitoring (rfmon) 
mode, and can sniff 802.11b, 802.11a, and 802.11g traffic.  Kismet identifies networks by 
passively collecting packets and detecting standard named networks, detecting (and given 
time, decloaking) hidden networks, and infering the presence of nonbeaconing networks 
via data traffic71.   
Figure 39 shows a screenshot of Kismet with 4 wireless APs 
detected with varying levels of encryption including two encrypted networks (SSID: 
2WIRE521, 2WIRE514) using WEP, one hidden encrypted network (SSID: Zemfira) 
using WPA, and one unencrypted network with no SSID. 
 
                                                 





Figure 39.   Kismet main menu screenshot (From Ref. 72) 
 
Using Figure 39 as a reference from left to right the Kismet basic 
interface consists of:  
• Name : SSID of network  
• T : Type of network  
• W : Identifies if network is secured or not  
• Ch : Channel on which the Access Point is on  
• Packts : Number of packets captured  
• Flags : Method in which IP was gathered (ex. A4 means IP was learned 
through ARP packet)  
• IP Range : IP of the network  
• Size : Total size of packets gathered from the Access Point  
 
Identifying Security  
Secured networks are always shown in green and the W column shows either Y 
(Yes) for WEP or O (Other) if any another type of security is used such as 
WPA/TKIP/LEAP/EAP/TLS. When you see an O in the W column select the network 
and press the I (Network Information) key and scroll down to the Encrypt : field and 
the specific type of security used is listed.  
                                                 
72 Remote Exploit, Research Kismet Primer Guide, http://new.remote-exploit.org/index.php/Research, 
Retrieved September 1, 2005. 
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Color Coding  
Kismet colors the networks listed to make it easier to identify its configuration. 
The following are the possible color combinations:  
• Yellow : Unencrypted network  
• Red : Networks this color are still using factory defaults  
• Green : This identifies secured networks using either WPA, WEP, or another 
form of security  
• Blue : These are hidden networks which can either be open or encrypted so 
check the W column  
 
Network Type  
The T (Type) column can list six possible wireless network types.  
• A (Access Point) - normal wireless access point  
• H (Ad-Hoc) - ad-hoc point-to-point wireless network  
• P (Probe request) - A wireless client that is not associated but is searching 
for a network  
• D (Data) - Data network  
• T (Turbocell) - Turbocell network  
• G (Group) - Group of wireless networks  
 
Command Reference  
• e - Open popup window of Kismet servers. This lets you simultaneously 
monitor two or more Kismet servers on different hosts.  
• z - Zoom network display panel to full screen (or return it to normal size if it 
is already zoomed)  
• m - Mute sound and speech if they are enabled (or unmute them if they were 
previously silenced). You must have sound or speech enabled in your config 
to be able to mute or unmute them.  
• t - Tag (or untag) the current network  
• g - Group currently tagged networks  
• u - Ungroup current group  
• c - Open client popup window to display clients in the selected network  
• n - Rename selected network or group  
• i - Display detailed information about the current network or group  
• s - Sort the network list differently  
• l - Show signal/power/noise levels if the card reports them  
• d - Instruct the server to start extracting printable strings from the packet 
stream and display them.  
• r - Display bar graph of the packet rate.  
• a - Show statistics about packet counts and channel allocation.  
• p - Display packet types as they are recieved.  
• f - Follow the estimated center of a network and display a compass  
• w - Display all previous alerts and warnings.  
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(3) Procedures.  The Joint Wireless Administrator Checklist73 
(JWAC) recommends mapping wireless signal strength quarterly and tracking authorized 
wireless devices as required.  This process will help to determine what wireless networks 
are in the area of operations and if there are unauthorized wireless networks plugged into 
a network of interest.    
A typical setup for Wardriving would be with the laptop on the 
passenger side seat or with two people, the passenger is in control of the laptop while the 
other drives.  The GPS unit is placed on the dashboard while the external antenna is 
magnetically mounted to the roof of the vehicle.  Most strategies for covering a specific 
area are sufficient but if you know what average distance your antenna covers you can 
organize how the route will be taken in order to maximize coverage and minimize driving 
time. 
Many mapping programs exist that can convert wireless scanning 
data into points on a map.  A Linux program called gpsmap which is meant to work with 
Kismet is a useful solution that can be used to plot where APs were seen.  Using a Kismet 
GPS file, gpsmap will download a map from Expedia, Mapblast, or Terraserver and plot 
the wireless access points.  Gpsmap also allows you to visualize the route taken during 
the wardriving session.  Figure 40 shows a sample Gpsmap screenshot with multiple 
wireless networks present. 
 
                                                 




Figure 40.   gpsmap sample screenshot (From Ref. 74) 
 
b. Locating Wireless Local Area Networks 
The process of detecting and locating WLANs is a relatively unproven 
technique in so far as the technical aspects of the process are concerned.  RF field 
strength monitors have been used for many years when working under 400 MHz and 
even up to 1GHz.  Portable, wideband, high frequency signal detection is a very 
specialized field and there are few products that are available to assist in trying to locate 
wireless APs or detect interfering devices.  Success in locating rogue access points on a 
network frequently will come from experienced engineers with knowledge in antenna and 
RF propagation.  Two of the products that have been evaluated in the previous chapter 
were used in each wireless vulnerability assessment described in this thesis.  The first is 
the BVS Yellowjacket and the second is the Cognio ISMS Analyzer.  Both can be used 
                                                 
74 Andrew Etter, (2002), A Guide to Wardriving and Detecting Wardrivers, SANS Institute, 
http://www.sans.org/rr/whitepapers/wireless/, Retrieved September 3, 2002. 
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effectively to locate devices although Yellowjacket is more effective at finding access 
points while the Cognio solution is more adept at locating devices that interfere with the 
WLAN signal.   
The most successful technique used for locating devices was with the 
assistance of a directional antenna combined with Yellowjacket and then isolating the 
MAC address of the given AP.  Once that is done, it is useful to switch to a small, low 
powered omni-directional antenna to minimize the total number of signals that may 
interfere with the physical locating of the AP.  The Cognio device was helpful in 
determining if a microwave or cordless telephone for instance in the 2.4GHz frequency 
spectrum was interfering with the wireless network’s signal.  This is particularly useful 
when attempting to locate an AP and the signal suddenly drops very low or completely 
out of range.  This can cause an inexperienced user to either change directions or deceive 
the user into thinking that the device is somewhere much further away from their current 
position.  When locating devices it is important to take into account what type of 
materials are nearby such as cement walls or lead objects and what devices may be 
operating in the same frequency that may cause the signal to decrease even though the 
AP could be within 10 feet.  Finally, once the wireless network has been located, it must 
be determined whether or not it is authorized to be operating. 
 
c. Access Point/Wireless Card Exploitation 
The next step is to ensure that WLAN transmissions do not pose a threat to 
the Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN).  A few questions that must be answered 
for example are:  Is the AP connected to the MCEN?  Is the AP configured according to 
Marine Corps Policy and overarching DoD policy?  Is a wireless card in a computer 
vulnerable to allowing unauthorized Ad-hoc connections to the network?   
Once these types of questions have been answered, it is most useful to test 
the AP and/or wireless client for vulnerabilities.  Some examples to begin with would be 
to check if MAC filtering is being used.  If it is, check to see if a spoofed MAC of an 
authorized client can access the network.  Next, check to see if encryption is enabled, and 
if it is disabled, check if it is possible for a client to associate to the WLAN.  If 
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encryption is enabled, attempt to crack it with known WEP or WPA cracking programs.  
As a guide, the checklist below can be used by an internal or external assessment team to 
either exploit and/or ensure security within a given WLAN. 
The following Figure 41, Wireless LAN Security Checklist, from the 
NIST Special Publication 800-48, provides users and implementers with detailed 
management, technical, and operational recommendations that should be addressed as a 
part of any WLAN implementation or vulnerability assessment. 
 Checklist 







1. Develop an agency security policy that addresses the use of 
wireless technology, including 802.11. 
3   
2. Ensure that users on the network are fully trained in computer 
security awareness and the risks associated with wireless 
technology. 
3   
3. Perform a risk assessment to understand the value of the 
assets in the agency that need protection. 
3   
4. Ensure that the client NIC and access point support firmware 
upgrade so that security patches may be deployed as they 
become available (prior to purchase). 
3   
5. Perform comprehensive security assessments at regular and 
random intervals (including validating that rogue access points 
do not exist in the 802.11 WLAN) to fully understand the 
wireless network security posture. 
3   
6. Ensure that external boundary protection is in place around 
the perimeter of the building or buildings of the agency. 
3   
7. Deploy physical access controls to the building and other 
secure areas (e.g., photo ID, card badge readers).  
3   
8. Complete a site survey to measure and establish the access 
point coverage for the agency. 
3   
9. Take a complete inventory of all access points and 802.11 
wireless devices.  
3   
10. Ensure that wireless networks are not used until they comply 
with the agency’s security policy. 
3   
11. Locate access points on the interior of buildings instead of 
near exterior walls and windows as appropriate. 
3   
12. Place access points in secured areas to prevent unauthorized 
physical access and user manipulation. 
3   
Technical Recommendations 
13. Empirically test access point range boundaries to determine 
the precise extent of the wireless coverage. 
3   
14. Make sure that access points are turned off when they are not 
being used (e.g., after hours and on weekends). 
3   
15. Make sure that the reset function on access points is being 
used only when needed and is invoked only by an authorized 
group of people. 
3   
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16. Restore the access points to the latest security settings when 
the reset functions are used. 
3   
17. Change the default SSID in the access points. 3   
18. Disable the broadcast SSID feature so that the client SSID 
must match that of the access point. 
 3  
19. Validate that the SSID character string does not reflect the 
agency’s name (division, department, street, etc.) or products.  
3   
20. Ensure that access point channels are at least five channels 
different from any other nearby wireless networks to prevent 
interference. 
3   
21. Understand and make sure that all default parameters are 
changed.  
3   
22. Disable all insecure and nonessential management protocols 
on the access points. 
3   
23. Enable all security features of the WLAN product, including 
the cryptographic authentication and WPA, AES encryption 
feature. 
3   
24. Ensure that encryption key sizes are at least 128-bits or as 
large as possible. 
3   
25. Make sure that default shared keys are periodically replaced 
by more secure unique keys. 
3   
26. Install a properly configured firewall between the wired 
infrastructure and the wireless network (access point or hub to 
access points). 
3   
27. Install anti-virus software on all wireless clients. 
http://www.cert.mil/antivirus/av_info.htm 
3   
28. Install personal firewall software on all wireless clients. 3   
29. Disable file sharing on wireless clients (especially in untrusted 
environments). 
3   
30. Deploy MAC access control lists.  3  
31. Consider installation of Layer 2 switches in lieu of hubs for 
access point connectivity. 
3   
32. Deploy IPsec-based VPN technology for wireless 
communications. 
3   
33. Ensure that the encryption being used is sufficient given the 
sensitivity of the data on the network and the processor 
speeds of the computers. 
3   
34. Fully test and deploy software patches and upgrades on a 
regular basis. 
3   
35. Ensure that all access points have strong administrative 
passwords. 
3   
36. Ensure that all passwords are being changed regularly.  3   
37. Deploy user authentication such as biometrics, smart cards, 
two-factor authentication, and PKI. 
 3  
38. Ensure that the “ad hoc mode” for 802.11 has been disabled 
unless the environment is such that the risk is tolerable. Note: 
some products do not allow disabling this feature; use with 
caution or use different vendor. 
3   
39. Use static IP addressing on the network.  3  
40. Disable Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP).  3  
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41. Enable user authentication mechanisms for the management 
interfaces of the access point. 
3   
42. Ensure that management traffic destined for access points is 
on a dedicated wired subnet. 
3   
43. Use SNMPv3 and/or SSL/TLS for Web-based management of 
access points. 
3   
Operational Recommendations 
44. Configure SNMP settings on access points for least privilege 
(i.e., read only). Disable SNMP if it is not used. SNMPv1 and 
SNMPv2 are not recommended. 
3   
45. Enhance access point management traffic security by using 
SNMPv3 or equivalent cryptographically protected protocol. 
3   
46. Use a local serial port interface for access point configuration 
to minimize the exposure of sensitive management 
information.  
 3  
47. Consider other forms of authentication for the wireless 
network, such as RADIUS and Kerberos. 
 3  
48. Deploy intrusion detection agents on the wireless part of the 
network to detect suspicious behavior or unauthorized access 
and activity. 
 3  
49. Deploy auditing technology to analyze the records produced 
by RADIUS for suspicious activity. 
 3  
50. Deploy an 802.11 security product that offers other security 
features such as enhanced cryptographic protection or user 
authorization features. 
 3  
51. Enable use of key-mapping keys (802.1X) rather than default 
keys so that sessions use distinct WEP keys. 
3   
52. Fully understand the impacts of deploying any security feature 
or product prior to deployment. 
3   
53. Designate an individual to track the progress of 802.11 
security products and standards (Internet Engineering Task 
Force [IETF], IEEE, etc.) and the threats and vulnerabilities 
with the technology. 
 3  
54. Wait until future releases of 802.11 WLAN technologies 
incorporate fixes to the security features or provide enhanced 
security features.  
 3  
55. When disposing access points that will no longer be used by 
the agency, clear access point configuration to prevent 
disclosure of network configuration, keys, passwords, etc. 
3   
56. If the access point supports logging, turn it on and review the 
logs on a regular basis. 
3   
 
Figure 41.   NIST WLAN Security Checklist (From Ref. 75) 
 
                                                 
75National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), (2002), Wireless LAN Security Framework 
Addendum to the Wireless Security Technical Implementation Guide , (Special Publication 800-48), 
Wireless LAN Security Checklist, http://iase.disa.mil/wireless/index.html, Retrieved August 18, 2005. 
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d) Bluetooth and Infrared (IR) 
Although the scope of this thesis limits the majority of our research in 
wireless security to 802.11, it cannot be emphasized enough the extreme vulnerabilities 
found in Bluetooth© and Infrared enabled devices.  Vulnerability assessments should 
always scan for Bluetooth and infrared services.  Bluetooth attacks can now be done from 
miles away as opposed to the limited distance of 30 feet as previously thought.  On an 
average installation it would be virtually impossible to not find any Bluetooth or IR 
devices connected to the target network or transmitting data from the network. 
 
4. Out-brief 
Once the assessment is completed, the initials results will need to be briefed back 
to the organization.  The out-brief is usually handled in similar fashion as the in-brief 
with regard to the level and the formality of the brief.  It is important to be flexible; 
however it is equally important to ensure that the appropriate level of audience is present 
to hear and provide momentum for any actionable findings.  During several of our 
assessments, it appeared as if we were not getting the attention of the necessary 
individuals during the either a respective in-brief or out-brief.  It was our intention and 
ultimately our strong recommendation that these briefings be received by no less than the 
responsible Communications Officer within the organization.  While this individual may 
not require the technical expertise of his Communications Chief or other WLAN 
administrators within his staff, it is imperative that the individual ultimately responsible 
directly understands any potential vulnerabilities that were found during the assessment. 
 
5. Formal Report to Document Findings 
While the initial results of the vulnerability assessment will be communicated 
during the out-brief, they will be formally documented in the final report.  The report 
should be in standard Naval Letter format and addressed to the Commanding Officer of 
the organization.  The report will identify the assessment date, the units and individual 
personnel involved, areas assessed, along with a detailed list of findings.  An example of 
a WLAN vulnerability assessment finding could be something as simple as the 
organization not implementing an encryption scheme like WPA to protect their WLAN 
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data.  However, the most important aspect of the formal report though is not the findings, 
it is the recommendations for corrective action.  This will provide the organization with 
guidance on how to correct any vulnerabilities.  The final critical piece of information in 
the final report is the date by which the corrective action must be implemented.  Due to 
the nature of most WLAN vulnerabilities, quick and decisive corrective actions are 
imperative to protect adjacent communication infrastructure. 
 
6. Conduct Follow-up Assessment on Deficiencies 
The final step to accomplish with regard to any assessment or evaluation is 
appropriate follow-up to ensure that corrective action has been implemented.  WLAN 
assessment follow-up is no less critical.  Without proper follow-up, the efforts to conduct 
the assessment, to include the investment of valuable time and resources will be lost.  For 
the most part, the follow-up assessment will not be nearly as thorough as the original 
assessment.  You will only need to review the vulnerabilities identified in your final 
report to ensure corrective action was implemented.   
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D. RECOMMENDED TOOLKIT 
 
1. WLAN Vulnerability Assessment Toolkit (WiVAT) 
One of the practical outputs that we wanted to achieve within the context of our 
thesis was the identification of a standard set of tools and procedures to conduct 
vulnerability assessments within the Marine Corps.  In that vain, we have selected several 
of the previously identified tools which we believe provide the most functionality, 
greatest utility, least amount of complexity, and represents the best value for conducting 
vulnerability assessment within the Marine Corps. 
 
a. Hardware/Software 
 In order to have a mobile toolkit used for assessing wireless security we 
started with two #1600 PelicanTM cases which provide unbreakable, waterproof, chemical 
resistant, corrosion proof, and buoyant protection for expensive and delicate electronic 
gear.  Two cases provide the flexibility to load one case with the requirements for a small 
assessment or both cases for a larger assessment.  
 The following list represents a quality set of hardware and software tools 
to be used for WLAN vulnerability assessments: 
• Pelican #1600 cases (2) 
• IBM laptops (2) – with internal wireless and Bluetooth card 
• HP iPaq PDA (2) – used with Yellowjacket and mini-stumbler 
• Garmin 60C GPS – used with Kismet to log GPS coordinates 
• Directional antenna (2) – with pigtails for different connectors 
• Omni-directional antenna (2) 
• BVS Yellowjacket 
• Cognio Intelligent Spectrum Management System card 
• Netgear 8 port 100Mbps Fast Ethernet Switch 
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• Remote-Exploit’s Auditor Security Collection bootable CD and all 
accompanying software included 
• Wildpackets Airopeek NX WLAN analyzer 
• Wildpackets RF Grabber distributed WLAN probe 
• Netstumbler & Mini-Stumbler for iPaq 
• Linksys WRT54GC Compact Wireless Router 802.11g 
• Linksys USB wireless compact adapter 
• Surge Protector (2) 
• Ethernet cables (8) – crossover and straight-through 
• Batteries and charging station 
• 100GB external hard drive 













Figure 42 and 43 show pictures of the individual hardware components laid out 
and packed into the Pelican cases. 
 
 





Figure 43.   WiVAT packed  (From Ref. 77) 
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VIII.     EXEMPLAR WLAN IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE AND 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE USAGE: 
A. HIGH LEVEL HARDENED WLAN 
 
1. Introduction to Wireless Implementation Research 
Four DoD organizational WLANs were evaluated during the course of this thesis 
research.  It should be noted that all four of these wireless implementations were found to 
have multiple weaknesses and associated vulnerabilities.  Our goal was to find a 
relatively secure WLAN according to policy and compare this secure implementation to 
what is currently employed in the DoD.  After extensive searching, it was possible to find 
one particular organization that was authorized to do this type of research and had 
funding available to implement a WLAN without operating restrictions or experimental 
constraints during the testing and implementation phases. 
This organization described will be referred to as Organization 3 because of 
classification issues.  This network took a total of two years to implement which required 
extensive research and budgeting for the requisite hardware and software to be purchased 
and installed.  This organization started with a 100MB backbone which created latency 
when 100 or more users were on the wireless network.  They were able to upgrade to a 
2GB fiber backbone and added supplementary APs which allowed large amounts of users 
to use the wireless network without any observed latency.  To date, no problems have 
occurred with this bandwidth and the goal is to have four buildings with a maximum of 
750 users.  It was determined that the costs savings for setting up a wireless network as 
opposed to wired was roughly $55,000. 
 
2. Defense in Depth 
This well known security principle which was discussed in Chapter Three, is 
prescribed by DoD Directive 8500.1.  This Directive requires the use Defense in Depth as 
a layered approach to network security.  This concept is particularly important in the 
wireless arena because there is no need to access the medium as would be required in the 
wired world.  The traffic is over-the-air and cannot be 100% secured by one layer of 
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defense.  To this end, all wireless traffic must be secured by multiple techniques which 
will be displayed further in this thesis. 
 
a. First Level 
In order to accomplish Defense in Depth, each layer must be carefully 
planned out in advance to ensure that each security area of the network is covered by 
multiple levels of defense.  For instance, in the first level of defense, the wireless network 
is physically and logically segmented to prevent easy access to the wired network.  This 
is what is considered the first level of defense and is also the least complex.  The second 
level is specifically dealing with encryption which in and of itself separates the wireless 
network from other unencrypted traffic.  This is done at layer 2 of the OSI model which 
is universally considered the appropriate technique as opposed to layer 3 which will show 
all IP addresses traversing the wireless network.  So between the first and second layer of 
defense, they synergistically make each other stronger by creating multiple obstacles to 
get past as opposed to one sole target to overcome.  VLANs provide segmentation by 
separating networks with different levels of value and corresponding security 
mechanisms.  For example, an organization’s data network may be considered at the 
highest level of value while voice may be medium level and visitor’s data may be at the 
lowest level of value.  Figure 44 shows how one device is able to accomplish network 
segmentation with VLAN capability. 
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Figure 44.   Network Segmentation (From Ref. 78) 
 
Organization 3 was able to use the network security principle of defense in 
depth by implementing what they consider, 5 levels of defense.  As mentioned 
previously, level 1 starts with “Wireless Network Segmentation.”  This is accomplished 
by either the suggested route which is a power-over-Ethernet switched network or using 
VLANs which is acceptable according to DISA.  In addition, the following levels 
combine to accomplish network segmentation. 
 
b. Second Level of Defense 
Level 2 is implemented using “Encryption Separation” also know as 
separation through encryption which means that no client can access the wireless network 
without a properly configured software client.  The software and hardware used to attain 
level 2 defense is known as Air Fortress which is FIPS 140-2 certified and encrypts all 
traffic at layer 2 with 128 bit AES.  At layer 2 of the OSI model the only observable 
traffic reveals MAC addresses in the clear.  No IP addresses or broadcast traffic can be 
sniffed.  Another advantage of layer 2 encryption is that clients inside the network cannot                                                  
78 Cisco Tech Talk: High-Security, High-Capacity Wireless Networks, http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-
bin/sreg2/register/banner.pl?LANGUAGE=E&METHOD=E&TOPIC_CODE=2949&PRIORITY_CODE=
127750_2, Retrieved July 22, 2005. 
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be attacked from outside of the encrypted network unless a Denial of Service attack is 
employed.  In contrast, layer 3 traffic is easily identified by the IP addresses in the clear.  
Anything broadcast can still be sniffed including POP, ARP, DHCP, NETBIOS, etc.  
With layer 3 encryption you leave the majority of your most important devices open to 
attack including your firewall, wireless gateways, and your clients.  Typical 
implementations of layer 3 encryption include IPSEC and VPN setups.  Organization 3 
concentrates on the maxim, “Maximum Security, Maximum Performance, Minimal 
Management79.”  Figure 45 shows how Air Fortress accomplishes encryption separation 
and how Organization 3 used the AF7500. 
 
Figure 45.   Air Fortress generic configuration (From Ref. 80) 
 
Fortress Technologies provides a comprehensive, robust wireless solution 
that is easy to implement and maintain. The Fortress solution offers 
complete protection of all platform investments by supporting the widest 
range of devices and existing networks.  To efficiently and securely 
address the inherent risks and vulnerabilities of wireless, the Fortress 
solution works with multiple wireless standards.  It installs easily into 
                                                 
79 Derek Krein, Tony Cerri,  Secure Wireless Networks Presentation, Norfolk, VA  April 29, 2005. 
80 Fortress Technologies, Fortress Enterprise Brochure, 
http://www.fortresstech.com/products/af2100.shtml, Retrieved July 22, 2005. 
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mixed-vendor environments including DOS legacy systems, providing a 
single point-of-administration for all wireless networks81. 
   






Figure 46.   Air Fortress generic configuration (From Ref. 82) 
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82 Fortress Technologies, Mobile LANs, Wireless Combat Information Systems Security, 








c. Third Level of Defense 
Level 3 defense capabilities consist of a wireless gateway with a firewall 
feature set.  This particular wireless gateway which was decided upon is called 
Bluesocket.  Bluesocket is a standards based solution which will work with most popular 
access points on the market today.  It has strong authentication mechanisms which 
include 802.1x pass-through and NTLM/Active Directory pass-through.  NTLM is 
Windows NT Challenge/Response authentication.  This solution provides Role Based 
access control, schedule, and location control.  In addition, it has extensive logging and 
packet capture capabilities.  Figure 47 shows all active connections on a sample wireless 
network 
 
Figure 47.   Bluesocket Active Connection screen (From Ref. 83) 
 
The Blue Secure Controller provides comprehensive authentication 
options utilizing username/password combinations or digital certificates, with the 
authentication database held locally or centrally in RADIUS, LDAP, NT Domain servers, 
                                                 
83 Bluesocket, BlueSecure Controllers Tour, 
http://www.bluesocket.com/products/controllerfamily.html, Retrieved July 22, 2005. 
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or Windows Active Directories.  Users can log into a Windows Domain and authenticate 
to the WLAN seamlessly with Bluesocket’s unique "Transparent Windows Domain 
Login.” Where AP-based WPA/802.11i authentication is required, Bluesocket 
complements the login process transparently, allowing appropriate access for the WLAN 
user. Where browser-based, secure (SSL) login is required (e.g. Hot Spots, Universities, 
Guests/Visitors), Bluesocket supports a customizable web-login page that allows end-
user branding and an ability to upload third-party SSL certificates. Where "non-
intelligent” devices need WLAN access, MAC-based authentication and role/VLAN 
assignment is supported, providing true wireless fire-walling capabilities.  Figure 48 
shows a Bluesocket sample topology configuration. 
 
Figure 48.   Bluesocket’s suggested topology (From Ref. 84) 
 
 
d. Fourth Level of Defense 
The 4th level of defense is a Wireless Intrusion Protection System (WIPS) 
previously known as a Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS).  Organization 3 
employed the Air Defense WIPS solution which is a very well known product that has 
been proven to work well and continually improves.  Improvements include 
modifications such as Air Termination or Containment which is automated through the 
Air Defense device in order to kick an unauthorized user or access point off of the 
network and keep them out.   
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A key concept that Organization 3 points out is the fact that a WIPS 
should be used whether you have an authorized WLAN or not.  The reason for this is to 
prevent rogue access points to set up wireless access to your wired network.  Another 
serious threat other than rogue access points that must be addressed is to ensure that ad-
hoc networks are not established which again, can give unauthorized access to the 
network.  Without an established WIPS, it would be very difficult to keep aware of rogue 
access points if not impossible.  These sensors are placed throughout the area of 
operations with enough coverage to assess all areas inside the buildings as well as any 
bleed-over outside of the buildings.  The Air Defense servers which the sensors connect 
to are placed on the internal network to prevent interference on the wireless network.  All 
sensor data is then sent to the server which can be accessed by the administrators via 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL).  The server is preconfigured to control the individual security 
policy that must be enforced.  Air Defense provides a near real-time performance view of 
the wireless medium. 
Air Defense has the ability to communicate with existing wireless 
management platforms & mitigate threats from the wired-side (port or switch), or in some 
cases, turn off the access point completely which is what the company calls Wired-side 
Termination.  Figure 49 shows sensor placement and an example topology. 
Figure 50 displays a recent and fairly successful technique called Air 
Termination or Containment.  After an intruder or attack is detected connecting to an 
access point, Air Defense can terminate the wireless connection from the intruder to the 
access point.  Air Defense can mitigate detected threats through the air or by wired-side 
via its Active Defenses, either manually or automatically via a predefined policy.  After 
the detection of an intruder or rogue device, Air Defense gives enterprises the ability to 
mitigate the threat by terminating the wireless connection between the intruder station 
and an authorized access point, or by terminating the connections of authorized stations 
to a rogue access point. This capability is enterprise-class, with role restrictions on who 
can terminate devices, and an audit trail of all termination activities, including time, 









Figure 50.   Air Defense Rogue AP and Termination techniques (From Ref. 86) 
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e. Fifth Level of Defense 
The 5th level of defense is a Centralized Wireless Network Management 
solution called AMP by Airwave, which brings all the defense levels together and unites 
them into one interface.  The AirWave Management Platform is a Linux-based software 
solution that installs quickly and easily on standard PC server hardware, typically in one 
or more network operations centers. Administrators and help-desk personnel can use 
AMP’s web-based user interface to remotely monitor and manage their wireless 
networks, or they can fully integrate AMP with their existing Ethernet network 
management solutions (such as HP OpenView Network Node Manager). 
AMP’s high-speed data collector uses non-blocking SNMP, HTTP, and 
other protocols to gather granular data, enabling the ability to quickly locate and view 
real-time information on every wireless device and user connected to the network.  AMP 
uses Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) to provide constant configuration 
management.  Organization 3 is using SNMPv3 which protects management traffic with 
encryption.  This is a great feature for large enterprise applications in which adding and 
removing of Access Points requires the most current configuration before you can put it 
on the network.  With AMP, all you need to do is plug it in, Air Defense will recognize it 
as a misconfigured AP, determine whether it is authorized or not and will push the correct 
settings.  AMP will also provide radio statistics at the AP and client level to determine 
number of users and percentage of bandwidth being used.  AMP can be configured to 
send near real-time alerts of problems or down AP’s, switches, Air Defense sensors, and 
other wireless network infrastructure components.  It also provides the user with site plan 
management features such as power, throughput, and Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) 





Figure 51.   AMP’s AP monitoring (From Ref. 87) 
 
 
Designed for efficiency, AMP’s scalable, distributed architecture allows 
you to configure, manage, and monitor Wi-Fi equipment across a LAN or WAN of any 
size — from local networks with 25 or fewer access points to global networks with tens 
of thousands of wireless network devices. 
AMP is a fully vendor-agnostic solution that supports new and legacy Wi-
Fi hardware from leading vendors, including Avaya, Cisco (Aironet and Airespace), 
Colubris, Enterasys, Funkwerk, HP ProCurve, Intel, LANCOM, Nomadix, Proxim, 
Symbol, and others. AMP automatically handles all communication with multi-vendor 
devices, allowing administrators to monitor and configure diverse networks from the 
same easy-to-use web console.  AP-based wireless scans using existing, authorized 
access points to scan the RF spectrum for other radios within range.  AMP also includes 
an API for integration with third-party RF-based intrusion detection systems (such as Air 
Defense). 
Figure 52 shows the ability to upload a floor plan with the AP’s location 
and detect rogue access points in relation to the authorized AP’s location.   
 
                                                 
87 Airwave, Airwave Product Line Overview, http://www.airwave.com/prodserv_products.html, 




Figure 52.   AMP’s visualRF (From Ref. 88) 
 
 
Figure 53 and 54 show Organization 3’s overall topology and a legend of device 
usage. 
 
                                                 
88 Airwave, Airwave Product Line Overview, http://www.airwave.com/prodserv_products.html, 
Retrieved July 22, 2005. 
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Figure 53.   Organization 3 overall topology (From Ref. 89) 
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3. Voice over IP (VOIP) 
 Organization 3 found that VOIP was an excellent way to leverage their wireless 
network investment to include cost savings for telephone services.  VOIP has been 
implemented on site with great success.  The phone network runs on Cisco’s VOIP 
technology which works well with the Cisco AP’s.  In addition, Vocera communicators 
have recently been implemented to extend the reach of the VOIP network to include 
mobile inter and intra- building communications.  This technology provides simultaneous 
hands-free two-way communication.  It has the capability to broadcast messages out to all 
users and conference call capabilities.  As it was mentioned previously in Chapter 5, 
Vocera recently added support for Cisco's lightweight extensible authentication protocol 
(LEAP) and temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP).  In addition, the company has 
released support for Wi-Fi protected access (WPA) which will be implemented 
completely by Organization 3 when the 802.11i protocol is ratified.  Figure 55 shows a 
sample Vocera topology and Figure 56 shows a close-up of a badge communicator. 
 
Figure 55.   Vocera sample topology (From Ref. 91) 
 
                                                 






Figure 56.   Vocera communicator (From Ref. 92) 
 
 
4. Power Over Ethernet 
In addition, Cisco’s solution for Power over Ethernet (PoE) is being used to 
address power restriction issues and cost savings to power the majority of the wireless 
infrastructure.  Organization 3 uses Cisco Catalyst switches to enable Power over 
Ethernet.  Deploying Gigabit Ethernet ports with Power over Ethernet not only provides 
the incremental performance and productivity gains expected from Gigabit Ethernet, but 
also allows organizations to invest in scalable technology that will enable the deployment 
of new applications and services without the need for additional upgrades such as 
electrical installations.  This gives the organization the ability to lower the overall cost of 
network ownership through optimal use of the LAN infrastructure, thereby reducing 
capital expenditures, simplifying manageability, and lowering operating costs.  One risk 
that must be considered when deploying PoE throughout the entire wireless infrastructure 
is the possibility that the switch that provides power for the WLAN may go down due to 
some unforeseen surge in power or any other problem which could result in a Denial of 
Service throughout the entire wireless network.  
                                                 




5. Remote Access 
Remote access is at the forefront of security issues and the problem is ensuring 
the same security within your network when outside the network.  Organization 3 uses 
SenForce and iPass encryption and policy enforcement solutions.  SenForce is a Layer 2 
policy enforcement agent while iPass prevents any client from connecting to the network 
without proper configuration such as up to date antivirus, patches or software.  In 
addition, while data is resident on a roaming computer outside the network, it is secured 
with Mobile Armor’s strong whole disk encryption.  This encryption is centrally 
managed software that supports multi-factor authentication.  Figure 57 shows iPass’s 
remote access topology and Figure 58 displays the Senforce Security Client with Central 




Figure 57.   iPass remote access topology (From Ref. 93) 
                                                 
93 iPass, Virtual Network Platform, http://www.ipass.com/platform/platform_demo.html, Retrieved 




Figure 58.   Senforce Security Client (From Ref. 94) 
 
6. Wired vs. Wireless 
One of the main reasons why it is decided to not use wireless networks is because 
the wireless network will not support certain features that the wired network does.  Of 
course it was originally thought that wireless was much less secure than wired, but now 
that is not quite true.  Another issue against wireless used to be bandwidth or throughput, 
which is often used for streaming audio, video, and video teleconferencing (VTC).  The 
original specifications for 802.11b did not contain the capacity for quality streaming of 
audio and video.  With 802.11a/g and other protocols being introduced, the ability to 
stream content is now possible on wireless networks.  Organization 3 can now stream 
video or IPTV to the desktop for applicable news and other information such as training 
without requiring each individual to be on site, as well as VTC capability.  VX30 is the 
java based software being used currently which also enables HTML over SSL for secure 
video streaming.  Figure 59 shows a typical VX30 Streaming Video Session. 
                                                 
 94 Senforce, Security Client, http://www.senforce.com/prodendsuite.htm, Retrieved July 28, 2005. 
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Figure 59.   VX30 Streaming Video Session (From Ref. 95) 
 
B. SUMMARY 
A diverse, high capacity and highly secure wireless network requires a skilled 
wireless network engineer along with extensive research and planning.  This research and 
planning guides the success of the network.  This organization demonstrated a very 
robust WLAN security implementation that can be extremely secure with little chance of 
interruption or vulnerabilities while reducing network costs significantly.  Organization 3 
researched the costs of wireless versus wired infrastructure and found that wireless is 
40% - 50% cheaper than wired networks.  Denial of Service attacks are always a concern 
whether it be wired or wireless and although wireless networks may be more vulnerable 
to this type of attack, WLANs will always have more powerful tools to combat this 
action.  Many of the roadblocks that prevent wireless networks from being implemented 
stem from the question; how can we build a secure wireless network within DoD 
standards?  This chapter provides one example of a potential WLAN implementation that 
strives to meet these standards. 
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IX. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED 
The overall purpose of our thesis was to improve the WLAN vulnerability 
assessment capability within the Marine Corps.  We sought to meet this objective by 
progressively speaking to practical and fundamental issues related to the assessment and 
security of wireless networks.  We began our research with a series of questions which 
we attempted to answer throughout the course of our thesis. The first question addressed 
the issue of why we need security in the first place.  Chapter One presented the numerous 
threats, vulnerabilities and potential attacks which can bring a network to its knees.  The 
second question we sought to answer was what can we do to mitigate those threats, 
vulnerabilities and attacks.  The answer, found in Chapter Two, was to employ 
fundamental security principles like defense in depth, encryption, traffic filtering, restrict 
access to the WLAN, and employ firewalls and IDSs.  The next question we asked was 
what 802.11 initiatives are currently employed within the Marine Corps.  Chapter Three 
discussed STRATIS and SecNet-11, two prominent systems which have been 
implemented in the Marine Corps.  The fourth question we sought to answer was, what is 
the security posture of WLANs within DoD.  Chapter Four presented three real world 
WLAN assessments and detailed their vulnerabilities.  Next, we asked what tools were 
available and best suited for conducting assessments.  Chapter Five provided evaluations 
on 12 different WLAN tools which could be used by the Marine Corps for the purposes 
of conducting vulnerability assessments.  The sixth question we sought to answer was 
how to conduct an assessment.  Chapter Six detailed standard procedures which could be 
used to conduct an assessment and presented a recommended toolkit which is ideally 
suited for conducting vulnerability assessments.  Our seventh research question queried 
the DoD landscape for a model of a secure WLAN.  Chapter Seven presented a real 
world exemplar WLAN implementation which hosted secure wireless transmissions.  Our 
final research question addressed what recommendations, based on our research, we 
would make to improve the security posture of WLANs within the Marine Corps.  Our 




The convenience created by wireless devices coupled with their relatively low 
cost was largely responsible for the exponential growth of WLANs over the past decade.  
However, the conveniences of wireless technology came at a significant cost.  WLANs 
have introduced vulnerabilities which must be countered in order to continue to reap the 
fruits of wireless labor.  Policy designers realized the shortfalls inherent in the 802.11 
standard and have subsequently released more security conscious standards.  In addition, 
DoD has established guidance which levies even more stringent requirements upon 
wireless network implementations within DoD.   
Unsecured WLANs are Cheap and Convenient 
Secure WLANs are Complex & Expensive 
Despite the presence of rigorous standards, which must be met in order to 
implement wireless networks, WLANs can be found on installations across the Marine 
Corps.  The small strides made by additional security conscious standards and more 
stringent DoD and Marine Corps wireless policies have not slowed the growth of 
WLANs or eliminated the threats introduced by wireless technologies to Marine Corps 
information infrastructure.  The plethora of WLANs in existence today was confirmed 
during the conduct of numerous WLAN vulnerability assessments aboard DoD and 
Marine Corps installations during the past year.   
Secure WLANs are Scarce 
Unsecured WLANS are Abundant 
A critical investment of personnel, resources, and training is required to create a 
credible WLAN Vulnerability Assessment capability.  Leaders, by and large, are not 
aware of the presence of WLANs or the threats introduced by them. In addition, 
personnel responsible for managing installation network resources are aware of wireless 
technology, but do not have the specific training or tools required to assess WLANs 
within their organizations.  The widespread presence of WLANs aboard DoD 
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installations requires the development of a mature WLAN vulnerability assessment 
capability within the Marine Corps.   
Awareness, Training and WLAN Tools are Insufficient 
Need for Vulnerability Assessments is Critical 
The combination of each of these factors creates substantial risks to information 
infrastructure aboard Marine Corps installations.  The lack of awareness and training 
requires a dynamic and proactive training plan which leverages the WLAN expertise of 
external agencies. In addition, specific WLAN tools are needed to properly outfit 
organization IA personnel with the requisite tools to locate and assess WLANs.  
However, the most effective method to mitigate the risks associated with cheap, plentiful, 
unsecured wireless devices is to conduct WLAN vulnerability assessments.  Effective 
training programs and capable tools combined with a proficient WLAN vulnerability 
assessment team will serve as an invaluable resource in mitigating the risks associated 
with wireless technologies. 
Trained Personnel Equipped with Capable WLAN Tools Create a Proficient 
Vulnerability Assessment Capability 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
During the course of our research, we have observed weaknesses and/or 
deficiencies in the current WLAN landscape within the Marine Corps.  This section will 
present those deficiencies along with recommendations on how to improve the WLAN 
vulnerability assessment capability within the Marine Corps. 
 
1. Information Assurance (IA) Toolkits 
The HQMC C4 IA has deployed toolkits to Major Subordinate Commands 
(MSCs) within the Marine Corps.  These toolkits were assigned during an annual training 
conference to IA Chiefs.  The toolkits were composed of a variety of open source and 
138 
commercial software tools which are hosted on a very powerful laptop.  Even though, the 
majority of the software was aimed at assessing the wired infrastructure, there were 
several very important WLAN analysis tools which were included.  As indicated in 
Chapter 6, NetStumbler, Kismet, and Ethereal are all capable software solutions.  In 
addition, the bootable CD, Auditor, is perhaps the most capable wireless tool provided by 
HQMC.  These tools should only represent a starting point towards outfitting IA Chiefs 
with the requisite tools required to conduct WLAN assessments.  Figure 60 represents the 
IA Toolkit software suite which was distributed to IA Chiefs. 
 
Open Source Tools 
Category Tool Potential Impact 




Nikto OS Crash, Bandwidth 
OS Fingerprinting/Port 
and Application Scanner 
NMap Bandwidth 
Wireless NetStumbler None 
Wireless Kismet None 
Wireless Ethereal None 
Password Cracker John the Ripper Account Lockout 
Network Discovery Sam Spade None 
Port Scanner Grinder Bandwidth 
   
Commercial Tools 
Category Tool Potential Impact 
Vulnerability Scanner eEye Retina DoS, OS Crash, 
Bandwidth 
Configuration Scanner Mitre Baseline Tool Kit 
(BTK) 
DoS, OS Crash, 
Bandwidth 
Password Cracker L0pht Crack Account Lockout 
Enumeration Solarwinds Bandwidth 
Network Discovery Fluke LAN Mapshot Bandwidth 
 
Figure 60.   IA Toolkit Software Suite (From Ref. 96) 
                                                 
96 HQMC C4, (2005), Information Assurance Toolkit Software Suite. 
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Recommendation: IA Chiefs will also need higher gain directional antennas 
which can be used to scan larger areas and pick up significantly more wireless traffic than 
external wireless cards with small omni-directional antennas.  In addition, the directional 
antenna should be coupled with a tool which can help physically locate rogue access 
points.  Handheld tools like Yellowjacket and AirMagnet Mobile offer “Geiger-like” 
meters which easily locate wireless devices which could compromise your WLAN.  More 
powerful WLAN assessment software would also provide a powerful deterrent to 
unauthorized wireless activity.  Tools like Airopeek and Cognio, which were introduced 
in previous chapters, would strengthen the IA tool inventory. 
 
2. WLAN Training 
The IA Toolkits are a solid point of departure for tackling WLAN assessment.  
Individuals charged with information assurance need certain fundamental tools in order 
to identify WLANs within their areas of responsibility.  The next critical requirement is 
to provide these individuals with specific training on how to use these tools and more 
advanced WLAN assessment education.   
The DoD Directive 8570.1 delegates training responsibilities on the individual 
service components.  It specifies that initial IA awareness orientation and annual IA 
refresher awareness be administered to all authorized users.  More importantly, DoD 
8570.1 charges the individual services with the responsibility to “establish, resource, and 
implement IA training and certification programs”.  The Directive goes on to specify that 
“these programs shall train, educate, certify, and professionalize personnel  
commensurate with their responsibilities to develop, use, operate, administer, maintain, 
defend DoD Information Systems.”  The Marine Corps has subsequently mandated that 
each IA Chief complete the Information Assurance Technician Course at Twenty-nine 
Palms, California in order to receive the 0689 Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).  
HQMC C4 IA has also recommended additional training and certification for IA Chiefs 
for professional development, although to date these additional training requirements are 





    
GIAC Security Essentials Certification (GSEC) SANS.org 
    
GIAC Certified Incident Handler (GCIH) SANS.org 
    
GIAC Certified Windows Handler (GCFW) SANS.org 
    
GIAC Certified Intrusion Analyst (GCIA) SANS.org 
    
GIAC Certified Windows Security Administrator (GCWN) SANS.org 
    
GIAC Certified Firewall Analyst (GCFW) SANS.org 
    
GIAC Security Expert (GSE) SANS.org 
    
Network + Comptia 
    
Security + Comptia 
    
Certified Information Systems Security Professional 
(CISSP) ISC2.org 
    
Systems Security Certified Practitioner (SSCP) ISC2.org 
    
GIAC Security Leadership Certification (GSLC) SANS.org 
   
Figure 61.   IA Chief Training Requirements (From Ref. 97) 
 
Recommendation: While the above recommended certifications provide 
foundational and advanced network and security training, WLAN specific training is not 
included.  Certified Wireless Network Administrator (CWNA) certification would 
provide IA personnel with basic WLAN orientation and fundamental WLAN 
management skills required to assess wireless networks. 
                                                 
97 HQMC C4, (2005), Information Assurance Chief Training Requirements. 
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Recommendation #2: In order to facilitate advanced training opportunities, we 
recommend the use of mobile training teams (MTTs) to provide on the job training for IA 
Chiefs in their actual work environments.  The MTT concept can provide expert 
assistance at a very reasonable cost.  The MTTs can be staffed from Marine Corps 
Network Operations Security Command, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), 
or the National Security Agency (NSA).  Each of these organizations has the requisite 
skills to impart advanced WLAN assessment training, not to mention inherent 
responsibilities for IA training from DoD 8570.1.   
Alternative Recommendation: Request an MTT from the Naval Postgraduate 
School for basic wireless subjects, WLAN security and WLAN vulnerability assessment 
training.  Students and faculty at NPS consistently seek opportunities for real world 
applications not to mention practical relevance within DoD.   These individuals possess 
the technical acumen and a wide assortment of commercial software and hardware tools 
at their disposal.  The application of these individuals and tools at a decisive point could 
generate significant interest and energy towards WLAN assessment and security. 
 
3. Special Education Program (SEP) Payback Utilization 
Marine Corps Officers graduating NPS normally serve a payback or utilization 
tour at designated organizations within the Marine Corps. These organizations have 
individually identified advanced education requirements and provided justification for 
SEP billet structure within their Table of Organization (T/O).   The majority of Marine 
Corps Officers serve utilization tours in less technical, more managerial roles like 
program managers or supervisory network positions.  While these billets serve critical 
functions within the Marine Corps, the technical skills learned from two years of an 
advanced technical education often goes unused.   
Recommendation:  Assign Marine NPS SEP billet structure to MCNOSC or 
HQMC C4 IA or other comparable organizations.  This structure would bring advanced 
education and experience with cutting edge technology that is well suited to tackle 
current WLAN vulnerability challenges faced by these organizations.  Organizations with 
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SEP billet structure could also require specific network security or wireless tracks be 
completed by students entering those billets.  Similar certification requirements are levied 
upon Contracting and Acquisition SEP students prior to filling Contracting and 
Acquisition billets. NPS currently offers five Committee of National Security Systems 
(CNSS) certificates from the Center for Information Systems Security Studies and 
Research (CISSR).  These certificates are sponsored by the National Security Agency 
(NSA) and exceed national training standards for IA professionals.   
Alternative Recommendation:   Given the scarcity of SEP billet structure and the 
difficulty in gaining new SEP structure without removing it from another organization; 
HQMC C4 IA and MCNOSC could supplement or augment workforce with NPS students 
seeking thesis research opportunities.  These agencies could literally field an entire 
vulnerability assessment team from three or four students with the appropriate 
background and training at NPS.  These students are searching for relevant subject 
matter, real world experience, and practical application to match their interest in 
advanced WLAN research. 
 
4. Increased Investment in WLAN Security and Assessment 
There are a tremendous amount of requirements that are now levied upon WLAN 
implementations within the Marine Corps by DoD Directives (8100.2, 8500.1, 8500.2), 
DISA’s Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) and Wireless LAN Security 
Framework, NIST Wireless Network Security Special Publication 800-48 and USMC IA 
Operational Standard 014.  These regulations are designed to ensure secure wireless 
transmissions and slow WLAN implementation until security technology matures.  
Natural inclination would assume that authorized WLAN implementations would be 
significantly reduced by the infusion of very stringent security requirements.  However, 
the overwhelming majority of our research suggests that authorized WLAN 
implementation is not slowing down.  In fact, our research suggests that an increase in 
unauthorized WLANs is a direct result of these stringent policies.  When an inexpensive 
and functional technology emerges, the natural inclination is to make use of it in order to 
increase efficiency without regard to upper-level policies and procedures. 
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Recommendation:  Invest more personnel and resources into developing a mature 
wireless vulnerability assessment capability within the Marine Corps.  Seek expertise 
from private industry where required.  Leverage security agencies within the Department 
of Defense for assistance until internal vulnerability assessment capability is mature and 
capable.  Leverage NPS students, faculty, and tools to conduct assessments and provide 
training to IA Chiefs, Network Administrators, and Communications Officers.  Increase 
awareness amongst installation commanders, MSC Commanders, and their respective 
Communications Officers.  These leaders require more training regarding the substantial 
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